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DEAN CHRISTOPHER GUTHRIE: My name is Chris Guthrie, and I am
the Dean of Vanderbilt Law School. On behalf of my colleagues, I’m
delighted to welcome you to Nashville, to Vanderbilt University, and
Vanderbilt Law School. We are thrilled to host you and support your very
important work. For making today’s event possible, I would like to recognize
your Chair, Judge and Professor Debra Livingston, and Professor Dan Capra,
who suggested that you hold your meeting here at Vanderbilt. Your work
reflects many institutional values that we hold dear at Vanderbilt Law
School.
First, we like you, reject the purported divide between a legal academy and
law practice observed and bemoaned by prominent American jurists like
Judges Harry Edwards and Richard Posner. Elite academics like those in this
room understand that their scholarship and teaching are enriched by practice
and by the insights of practitioners. Elite lawyers and judges like those in
this room appreciate that their day-to-day work benefits from insights
gleaned from the academy. Law, in short, is a scholarly discipline and a
professional vocation, and the best lawyers, teachers, and scholars embrace
and embody both the scholarly and the practical.
Second, your work is consistent with our commitment as a school to law
in action. We certainly care deeply about legal theory as theory and we
recognize that scholarship can be an end in and of itself. But as a faculty
here, we are more oriented toward legal scholarship that has real-world
impact. Impact on scholarship, of course, but also on lawyers and law
practice, judges and judicial decision-making, regulators and regulations, and
policymakers and the policies they promulgate.
Third, your work today on scientific evidence is consistent with our
institutional commitment to engage with other disciplines. Most of our
faculty have meaningful disciplinary training outside of law including
doctrinal training in multiple fields. Our faculty holds secondary
appointments in many schools and departments on campus including
biology, chemistry, economics, history, management, medicine, political
science, psychiatry, radiology, and sociology, and we are home to a unique
PhD program in law and economics, as well as a law and neuroscience
program funded by the MacArthur Foundation. As a school, we therefore
believe we are a logical host for you and your work, and we are thrilled that
you are here with us. And speaking personally, I’m particularly pleased to
have you here at this moment in time because you are devoting yourselves to
factfinding and truth-seeking. Regrettably, we live in an era in which facts
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are often treated like opinions and every side seems to have its own preferred
truth. This means that your work is more important now than ever. So, thank
you very much.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: I want to thank the Dean for his really warm and
welcome remarks. I’m Debra Livingston, Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules, and Dan Capra, the Reporter to the Committee, has asked
me to just say a few words before we kick off the symposium. Welcome to
our judges and our guest professor today. We’ve been wrestling with Federal
Rule of Evidence 7021 for some time now, addressing whether we should
recommend to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
to take up a possible amendment to the Rule. We’re looking now principally
at the proposal to add a provision about overstatement of an expert’s
conclusion to the Rule. The principal reason for our inquiry, the principal
motivating factor when we took it up, was the special concern with forensic
feature–comparison evidence. But members of the Standing Committee
suggested that while we were engaged in this inquiry, we should take a look
at Daubert 2 too, as a whole, as it has been over twenty-five years since
Daubert was decided, and this seemed like an opportune moment.
At the same time that we were looking at a possible amendment, we’ve
also thought from the start that our Committee might play an important role
in furthering judicial and legal community education about, specifically, the
forensic feature–comparison subject, recognizing from the start that if it was
an amendment that would correct this problem or help eliminate this
problem, it would require education in the bar. So, we’ve been in ongoing
discussions with the Federal Judicial Center. The Second Circuit has already
done a panel on the subject of forensic feature–comparison evidence, and as
a result of the good work of the Federal Judicial Center and Dan and Fordham
Law School and Duke, I’m apprised that they are in the process of planning
for yet another program on the subject in the near future. From the beginning,
we’ve understood that an amendment to Rule 702 would not reach just
forensic feature–comparison evidence but would, in all likelihood, if we
ultimately came to the decision, need to be a general amendment, so
impacting the range of cases. And this is a challenge because the evidence
that is considered under Rule 702 really runs the gamut.
We had a number of judges appear before us in the past and we have heard
a range of very informed views. It was Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern
District of New York who initially proposed that we might think about a way
to regulate an expert’s overstating the conclusion that could be supported by
the expert’s principles and methods.3 We’ve had some other judges that
expressed some concerns that maybe a limitation on overstatement is already

1. FED. R. EVID. 702 (outlining the requirements an expert witness must meet to be
permitted to testify).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Symposium, Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1463, 1494–96 (2018).
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built into the Rule and it would complicate the application of Daubert to add
such a requirement to the Rule.4
So, we decided that we should have a judge- and professor-only panel and
really try to ask people who have been using Daubert as judges how this
result might affect their work and how we should think about it going
forward. We are also hoping today that we are going to hear a lot about best
practices and that we can take some of the ideas expressed today and
introduce them to the Federal Judicial Center to talk about the application of
Rule 702 more broadly across the gamut of scientific and experiential
technical evidence.
So, I’m going to turn it over to Dan. I would encourage to all of the
Advisory Committee members to intervene with questions. Dan and I have
worked on preparing some questions, and he is going to play the role of
moderator.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Livingston thought about this panel as a
best practices panel, and so I was tasked with finding judges throughout the
country who had just written impressive Daubert opinions and have had a lot
of experience in dealing with Daubert issues. I found five of the very best,
so let me introduce them quickly: Judge Vince Chhabria from the Northern
District of California, Judge John Z. Lee from the Northern District of
Illinois, Judge William Orrick from the Northern District of California, Judge
Edmund Sargus from the Southern District of Ohio, and Judge Sarah Vance
from the Eastern District of Louisiana. Each of them has wrestled with some
very complicated Daubert issues and has come out on top in my view, so I
think they are good people to tell us about what the challenges of Daubert
are.
And then we are very happy to have Professor Ed Cheng from Vanderbilt
Law School here as a commentator. He is the foremost scholar on expert
evidence in the United States, so we are very happy to have him here and
thank him for helping me put this together. I want to spend one minute to
provide background for today’s discussion, for people who might be
unfamiliar with the topic.
Today we will be talking about Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,5
a 1993 opinion which established a gatekeeper function under which courts
must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s methodology
is reliable.6
The Supreme Court set forth the famous Daubert factors, which we might
talk about today a little bit: testability, peer review, existence of standards
and controls, assessment of rate of error, and general acceptance of the
methodology.7 One of the things I want to talk about today is that one of the
problems right out of the gate is that the Court in Daubert provides
4. See, e.g., Symposium, Conference on Proposed Amendments: Experts, the Rule of
Completeness, and Sequestration of Witnesses, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1376–77 (2019).
5. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
6. Id. at 592–93.
7. Id. at 592–95.
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inconsistent messages. On the one hand, the Court instructs that trial judges
must be serious about scrutinizing the reliability of an expert’s
methodology.8 The gatekeeper cannot admit the evidence unless it finds the
methodology reliable by a preponderance of the evidence9—because if the
gatekeeper does not scrutinize it closely, unreliable expert testimony will be
put before jurors, who won’t be able to understand just why it is unreliable.
But on the other hand, the Daubert Court says that cross-examination and
argument, not exclusion by the trial judge, are the preferred ways to deal with
“shaky but admissible evidence,” whatever that means.10 So, Daubert is a
schizophrenic opinion and a lot of post-Daubert cases provide the same
mixed signals, stating for example that “the proponent has the burden of
proving the reliability of the expert’s testimony”11 but also saying that the
presumption is in favor of admissibility of expert testimony, which to me
seems inconsistent.
Then General Electric Co. v. Joiner12 emphasized that trial courts have
significant discretion in the gatekeeper review.13 It also clarified that the
gatekeeper review is not only about methodology because if there is a gap
between the methodology and the conclusion, then that is something that the
judge should be concerned about.14 Next, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael15
established that the gatekeeper function applies to nonscientific experts as
well, recognizing, though, that applying the Daubert factors such as peer
review to nonscientific experts becomes difficult, and some have held that
Daubert is not strictly applicable in that situation.16 The bottom line from
the trilogy is that the trial court must ensure that the expert is using the same
degree of intellectual rigor in reaching the in-court opinion as you would
expect them to use in their job outside of court.17 And then this Committee
joined the party in 2000 by amending Rule 702,18 and it was designed to
simplify the Daubert trilogy and the hundreds of cases that applied it. And
the Committee set forth three reliability-based requirements to be met by a
preponderance—sufficient facts or data, reliable methodology, reliably
applied.19 And there’s a giant Committee note which has been referred to
8. Id.
9. See id. at 592 n.10.
10. Id. at 596.
11. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Thus, the
party seeking to have the district court admit expert testimony must demonstrate that the
expert’s findings and conclusions are based on the scientific method, and, therefore, are
reliable. This requires some objective, independent validation of the expert’s methodology.”).
12. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
13. See id. at 142–43.
14. See id. at 146.
15. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
16. See id. at 141–42, 151.
17. Id. at 152 (“[A]n expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
19. See id. r. 702 (describing the requirements an expert witness must meet to be allowed
to testify).
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very often by courts in navigating Daubert issues.20 Given that landscape,
let’s proceed with the panel discussion.
I. TOPIC ONE: HANDLING MULTIPLE DAUBERT MOTIONS AND
OVERSTATEMENTS IN COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC CASES
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judges, what happens when you have a complex
scientific case and your clerk comes to you and says there are eight Daubert
motions? The reason that there are eight is because there are eight experts
and it seems that today all of the experts in complex cases get challenged
under Daubert. My sense is that in the early days after Daubert, it was mostly
plaintiffs’ experts that were subject to Daubert motions, but now it’s
everybody, and so where do you go? What do you do? The late Judge
McLaughlin said to me once: “Under Frye,21 I could always count, I was a
very good counter. But now I’ve got to learn biology. Last time I took
biology was in high school and I hated it so much I became a lawyer. So
now I have to become a biologist again.” Do you evaluate scientists when
you are not a scientist? We’ll just start there.
JUDGE VANCE: I will take a crack at it. The first thing I want to
understand is what the area of expertise is, what the expert can prove, and
how they got there. I look at the Daubert factors, but I also try to figure out
what an expert in this field is supposed to do. And a lot of times I rely on the
Federal Judicial Center Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence.22 For
example, there is a really good section on epidemiology that describes the
epidemiological process and gives you a sense of what someone who’s doing
it right would do.23 And then I look for what I would call red flags that would
tip you off if this is not being done properly, and sometimes you can find that
in case law that has critiqued similar types of studies or similar types of work.
But you really have to get an understanding of the science yourself, not only
through the reading of briefs but also whatever external sources you can get
your hands on. Some judges use “science days” to get a tutorial from the
parties on the applicable science.24 But what I try to do is understand the
expertise involved and what they are supposed to be doing, what a good
analysis would look like, and then look at what I’ve got and see what the
expert did.
JUDGE LEE: If a clerk comes to me and says there are eight Daubert
motions, one of the first things we create is a spreadsheet chart and one of
20. Id. r. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
21. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (establishing the general
acceptance test for the admission of scientific evidence).
22. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d
ed. 2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/SciMan3D01.pdf [https://perma.cc/
76Z4-GPCP].
23. See generally Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 22, at 549.
24. See generally MELISSA J. WHITNEY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TUTORIALS ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (2018), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/02/Tutorials_Science_
Technology_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/48T2-N4JL].
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the first things I want to determine is, “Do you have the qualifications?” How
do the qualifications overlap with the issues in the case? Sometimes there
are issues and opinions that are relevant to the case and come within the
witness’s qualifications. A lot of times it is more like a Venn diagram. There
are certain opinions that the expert is rendering that actually do fit his or her
particular niche and qualifications. But then, to try to deal with some of the
particularities of the case, sometimes they stray beyond those central
opinions. So one of the first things I try to do is try to ferret out, based on
the expert report, which are the opinions that are within the expert’s particular
realm of expertise and which are the opinions that I think they are straining
to reach to deal with the particularities of the case. And then once I ask that
the former be highlighted in yellow, the latter in green, and then the latter
ones are the ones that I really start focusing on first.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I have to ask you a question about that. I think
the standard for basic qualification of an expert—those you would highlight
in yellow—is pretty mild. But courts are strict in limiting the expert to their
area of expertise. Would you agree, Judge Lee?
JUDGE LEE: I think so. I had a recent criminal case where the defendant
was accused of violating tax laws.25 She was part of the “sovereign citizen”
movement.26 I won’t go into what the movement is—I’m sure a lot of you
know—but in the end she submitted fraudulent estate tax information, and
her defense was, “I was part of this group, this cult, and I was brainwashed
into doing it. I didn’t have the sufficient criminal intent.”27 And so her
attorney offered, as an expert, a psychologist who was a general psychologist
but didn’t really have much expertise in cults.28 He had some experience
with group dynamics—not really cults—but he did a lot of research on cults
and then decided that the group fit all definitions of a cult.29 And so, then
the question became, as you said, how do those particular opinions fall within
his expertise, or do they not? And I found that his opinions were outside of
his expertise.30
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Thanks, Judge Lee. Another question that I see
frequently arising at a Daubert hearing is that one side will argue that the
other expert has missed something when in fact they haven’t. So the party is
cherry-picking the other side’s arguments. How do you deal with that kind
of issue? For example, the defendants say that the plaintiff’s expert didn’t
read this report, but if you look to the plaintiff’s expert, she actually states

25. See generally Order, United States v. Truitt, No. 14 CR 718 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017),
ECF No. 98 (excluding an expert’s testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert).
26. United States v. Truitt, 938 F.3d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 2019) (The defendant was a
member of the Moorish Science Temple of America, “which views itself as a sovereign
‘ecclesiastical government’ . . . [and] teaches that neither the states nor the federal government
have any authority over its members.”).
27. See id. at 886.
28. See id. at 888–89.
29. See id.
30. See Order, supra note 25.
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that she has read the report. So what do you do when one side—often both
sides—misrepresents that adversary expert’s opinion?
JUDGE ORRICK: You can figure all that out from the papers. That’s not
very hard to do. In answer to your first question, if a law clerk comes to me
with eight Daubert motions, I say well, you’ve got a lot of work to do.
[Laughter]
As to the question of how to get up to speed on the science, I don’t know
how much I’m going to have to know in any of these cases and I probably
won’t be able to figure out the entire science. So, I look to where the parties
are—what the points are that the parties are arguing about and I work
backwards from there and figure out, okay, so what makes sense about this?
Where is the disagreement? Why is there disagreement here? If I have to go
as far as Sarah goes, to the Manual on Scientific Evidence,31 for instance,
then I’m usually in trouble.
JUDGE VANCE: Can I add something to this? If I have expert motions,
what I’ll do is look at them and figure out if one of them is stacked on the
other. And if one of them is going to make the rest of them go away, I’ll
focus on that one first and decide that one. Then the rest of them will fall if
the first one does.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Like the “me too” experts—the ones who
basically say, “I agree with everything Expert 1 says.”
JUDGE VANCE: Yes. And another example is that if you don’t have
general causation, you can’t have specific. So you deal with the general
causation first and figure out where the bodies are buried in that. And Judge
Orrick is right. You have to figure out what the fight is about. But it helps,
once you know that, to look at the field and figure out what they do to ferret
that issue out.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: How often will you hold a hearing on a Daubert
motion and do they help?
JUDGE VANCE: A lot of times I do it on the briefs. But if I get briefs, I
get the report. I’ll ask them for the studies. I’m not shy about asking them
to give me more information. And if I think I need a hearing after that—it’s
infrequent that I have live hearings, but when I have them, it is pretty
intense—I will let them know in advance what is on my mind so that they
can focus. But when you have a hearing, what happens is that you’ve already
got the briefs, and then they come in with extra affidavits tailored to the
hearing, so it is even more material to read. But the hearings can be helpful,
I have to say that. If you get to the point where you really need to hear it
yourself, you can then ask questions yourself and that helps cut through the
adversarial positions and you can try to corner the expert to tell you exactly
what you want to know.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: What causes you to decide you need a Daubert
hearing? Is it usually that the science is too difficult? You really need to ask

31. See generally FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22.
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some questions? You just need more than the papers can give you? Why
would a hearing be a bad thing in that instance?
JUDGE VANCE: I don’t think the hearing is a bad thing. What I was
referring to is that you get more papers right on top of the hearing to review,
maybe more studies, supplemental reports, that sort of thing. I think what I
find helpful in hearings is that sometimes you can tell where there is a “fudge
factor” on one side or the other and if you ask the questions, you can get
somebody to make a concession.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, about asking questions—do you tell them in
advance what the questions are going to be at a hearing?
JUDGE VANCE: Sometimes I do that and sometimes I don’t. But it helps
if you can get them focused. I find that if you think an expert is fudging
about something, you can push on them to see if they will give in and concede
that there is more in common with the other expert than would meet the eye
from just reading their papers. Because the lawyers prepare the papers. A
lot of what you see from the experts is written by the lawyers, having been
one myself. The lawyers may give the expert a list and ask, “Can you say
this, this, this, this, and that?” If he says yes, you hire him. With that in
mind, if you have the expert and you can ask the questions yourself, you may
get a more unvarnished answer than you would get if it is filtered through the
lawyer.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Yes, and let me just support what Sarah said about
that. First of all, on the issue of hearings—I think in the large majority of
Daubert motions, we don’t have hearings because, number one, a lot of times
the Daubert motions aren’t particularly important to the summary judgment
motion that we are deciding. So, a lot of times we will just say that we won’t
even rule on them because we can decide the summary judgment question
without them. Then there are some that of course we need to consider, but it
is just not that difficult. I think we would all probably agree that in those
cases where there is a science question that is complicated and central to the
outcome of the case, we are going to have hearings, and we are probably
going to have really long hearings.
And I do think, as Sarah said, it is very important for the judge to be
actively involved in the questioning; interrupt the lawyer’s crossexamination; interrupt the lawyer’s direct examination; take their own period
after the cross is done and have a session with the expert because they will
be more candid with the judge, certainly more than with the opposing side.
They don’t want to concede anything to the opposing side. Be transparent, I
guess, about two things. One is to be transparent about what you are
concerned with so that the expert has a chance to address it. The second thing
that I think is important to be transparent about—your initial question was
how do you make yourself a scientist? What I try to do is be very transparent
that I don’t have any illusions about making myself a scientist.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: You say that you don’t know?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: What I say is that I went to UC Santa Cruz and the
only science class I took was Physics for Poets and you need to know that so
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that you tell your experts who you are dealing with and that your experts
should be prepared to start from scratch. I think it is very important to be
very transparent about what you don’t know so the parties can adequately
educate you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: You’d think that kind of warning would be useful
because if they testify at trial, they are going to have to explain themselves
to a jury. If the judge doesn’t understand, the jury is not going to understand.
So that is an important point. You just say, “I don’t understand,” and you
make them explain.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: So, one of the issues we are dealing with is this
issue of overstatement of an expert’s conclusion. When you have Daubert
motions, does the question of overstatement get raised in that context? For
example, I suppose if it’s a forensic case and they want to testify to a “match,”
perhaps that question is raised. But, in some cases that I have seen, it looks
like maybe the ultimate degree of confidence that an expert gives for an
opinion may not show up until the trial. So, do you usually resolve any
overstatement questions in your Daubert motions or are there some that
somehow get past that and then they show up at the trial phase or the hearing
phase? To put it another way, does the Daubert motion process resolve the
overstatement issues or are there cases when it does not?
JUDGE SARGUS: One of the problems with answering that question is
that I have Daubert issues in various types of cases. Typically there is a lot
of money involved and the experts are highly credentialed and we do get into
questions about opinions going too far, or an opinion giving a legal
conclusion, or the “ultimate issue” kinds of questions that have to be
resolved. So, I do bump into those overstatement questions in a Daubert
hearing. In other cases, though, when you are dealing with somebody
bumping into something at a Walmart and somebody holding themself out as
an expert on displaying things in a store—a very different kind of expert—
worrying about overstatement becomes even a bigger issue because they are
not as sophisticated.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Well, what about an expert who relies too heavily
on a study? In other words, she takes the good parts of the study and rejects
the rest. The resulting conclusion is a form of overstatement, saying “I can
conclude on the basis of a cherry-picked study.” That would get regulated in
the hearing.
JUDGE VANCE: Right.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Well, I think this concept of overstatement is
probably covered in the Joiner case that you mentioned—the gap between
methodology and conclusion.32 That’s not to say it wouldn’t necessarily be
useful to have it in the Rule because it might prod judges to focus on that
aspect of the Daubert inquiry more, but I think that overstatement comes up
with regularity in the papers. I think that is something you can start to root
out in the papers. And what I have found is that when you have a hearing
32. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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and, as Sarah mentioned, the expert report is drafted by the lawyer—and I
think oftentimes the expert doesn’t really give terribly careful consideration
to what is in that report. But when you get the expert on the stand, they will
often dial back some of the overreach that is contained in the report and
sometimes, again often in response to questions from the judge, they will
often even dial back things that they said in their deposition.
PROFESSOR CHENG: Can I follow up on that? When we are talking
about overstatement, is it so apparent that surely the jury could understand
that? Or that on cross at trial, would the opposing counsel make that apparent
so that the jury would deal with it on its own? Or is it overstatement, in ways
that you normally see, in that it becomes opaque and therefore misleading to
the jury and the jury would never be able to figure it out?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That is the question that the Committee has been
discussing, whether overstatement is a question of admissibility or weight.33
JUDGE SARGUS: In the area of experts, the idea that overstatement can
be remedied on cross-examination or comparison to other witnesses—I’m
not confident of that just because they are experts. Their specialty is so great
that I’m not sure a lay juror would comprehend that the expert is overstating
a conclusion.
JUDGE VANCE: On the issue of exaggeration, I definitely think it is
covered under the current Rule under the Joiner analysis. In the Fifth Circuit,
the reliability test applies to the linkage between the method and the
conclusion and at every step of the process,34 so I clearly think that it is
covered under the current Rule. I do have an issue with a formulation of a
Rule that prohibits exaggeration of conclusions based on a reliable method
reliably applied. I don’t understand how you can have a reliably applied
method where you are going to say “I’m 95 percent or 99 percent confident”
from a method that does not generate that confidence level and cannot
generate that confidence level. I don’t know how that is a reliably applied
methodology.
So, I think in packing in those two things in the verbiage of the Rule—that
is somewhat of a disconnect for me. I think it would be helpful to judges to
alert them to a concern about witnesses testifying to “a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty.” I have seen a recent opinion from a judge in West
Virginia taking on “reasonable degree of medical certainty” and pointing out
that it is meaningless.35 It doesn’t mean anything to anyone and so don’t use
33. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, AGENDA OF MAY 3, 2019, at 62 (2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05-evidence-agenda-book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/99JE-PUTQ] (“The Advisory Committee is also considering an amendment
to Rule 702 that would address some courts’ apparent treatment of the Rule 702 requirements
of sufficient basis and reliable application as questions of weight rather than admissibility,
without finding that the proponent has met these admissibility factors by a preponderance of
the evidence.”).
34. See, e.g., Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he expert’s testimony must be reliable at each and every step or else it is inadmissible.”).
35. Edwards v. McElliots Trucking, LLC, Civil Action No. 3:16-1879, 2017 WL
3611848, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 22, 2017) (noting that “the phrase ‘reasonable degree of
medical certainty’ has no relationship to medical science whatsoever”).
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it. And so I think judges are taking that on in the regular Daubert process,
but calling their attention to the findings of these scientific studies and
limitations on conclusions is helpful.
JUDGE LEE: I want to pick up on the question of admissibility versus
weight.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes.
JUDGE LEE: I think, in the end, what I tell my clerks is that it’s less of a
bright line and more of a continuum. What I try to do—my guidepost—is:
would a reasonable juror be able to understand the subject matter of the crossexamination to a sufficient degree that they can meaningfully weigh the
deficiencies versus the probative value of the testimony? But it really comes
down to, “What are you talking about?” Are you talking about a complicated
multivariable regression or are you talking about an expert that says, “Oh,
well, you know, in order to calculate the volume of the cube you multiply
height times width times depth, right?” If it is the latter, and the objection is
“Well, you are supposed to do three things and you only did two,” I think
that a jury could probably weigh that. But if it’s something as complicated
as, “You are overstating the literature because you are looking at this study
when that study didn’t consider these variables while this study did,” I think,
in my mind, it depends on whether or not that is a type of objection that can
be effectively raised on cross-examination—number one—given the
constraints of a trial. And number two, if it can be, whether it is something
that a reasonable juror, in my mind, can actually get their arms around and
do in a meaningful way. I think it is unlikely in my example of overstating
the literature.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Again, when we are talking about one of these
complicated scientific inquiries, it’s not most Daubert motions. But for these
ones, you know, the judge is able to have seven days of Daubert hearings.
Before the expert takes the stand, the judge reads the briefs, reads the expert
reports, maybe looks at some of the expert deposition testimony, and reads
the actual studies that the experts are talking about and has a lot of time. The
jury is sitting there in the trial, has not read the studies before the expert
comes up and testifies, has not read any of the briefs, and doesn’t even get to
bring the studies back into the jury room to look at. They are just shown
quotes on the board that the expert wants them to see in support of this
opinion that they are hearing for the first time. So, I think it is much easier
for a judge in the Daubert process to root out overstatement in a complicated
case after climbing the learning curve than it is for a juror who is in the heat
of trial. And that is often exacerbated by the fact that in civil trials we are
increasingly imposing time limits, though that is a justifiable practice. We
are all very conscious of not wasting the time of the members of the
community who have been called in to serve as a jury, but a downside to it is
that the jurors don’t get to spend nearly the time that the judge does looking
at this evidence.
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: What happens in that situation where you perform
a gatekeeper function on experts on both sides and find that both sides’
experts are admissible? First, how can that be? And second, when it
happens, how does it play out with the jury? Conceptually, how does it work
that you can say that both sides pass Daubert?
JUDGE SARGUS: Well, I think that is the process. You get conflicting
testimony, often based on a different take on disputed facts, and jurors are
there to decide conflicting facts. But I have a lot of cases where I could look
at this and say that each opinion has some basis in fact, some science behind
it, is reliable, and fits all the Daubert requirements—but their conclusions are
different. They are focusing on different parts of the same picture.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I guess it works if one side’s expert is relying on
a set of facts and another expert on a different set of facts and then you just
prove the facts. The jury can do that. But when they are relying on different
theories, I think it would be difficult for a jury to figure out. So, in your
experience, how does it work when juries see these battles of experts?
JUDGE VANCE: Not to sound like a cynic, but when I was a lawyer, we
always said, “You don’t win a case on cross.” You’re not going to win a case
on cross-examination, and so I think cross-examining an expert is not going
to carry the day with a jury. They are going to go with the overall narrative
of the case, the story in their mind of who should win, and if the expert is in
parallel with that version of the case, that side is going to win.
So, if you let the expert in and the jury likes that side, they are going to go
with them, but I don’t think the cross-examination of the expert is going to
produce an “aha” moment for the jury where they are going to go, “Well, that
settles that.” I just don’t think that is the way it works.
JUDGE ORRICK: Well, except in the cases where the expert is really
central and the expert is very defensive on cross-examination.
JUDGE VANCE: Yes, if he’s not likable.
JUDGE ORRICK: Yes. I think the optics of experts, once you get past
the gatekeeper function, are most important. I want to go back to agree with
my colleague from the Northern District, except for the idea that we have
seven days to spend on Daubert hearings. The notion that we need an
additional statement in the Rule about overstatement, I think, is just going to
make judges’ lives worse because, I think, reliability takes care of
overstatement in the ways where it counts. If we add an additional element
to 702, then that is just going to be an additional five pages in a brief about
why this person should be excluded.
MS. NESTER: Can I jump in there and ask—we’ve been talking in the
realm of the civil world, but in the criminal world when an expert overstates,
it could mean the difference between conviction and acquittal. So, there is
the concern that in the criminal field, especially in the forensics field,
overstatement that a jury is not intellectually capable of assessing could result
in someone being incarcerated wrongly. That has happened many times over
the years. So, you don’t think that maybe tweaking that for the criminal side
would be helpful?
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JUDGE ORRICK: I think for any expert to say, for example, with
probabilistic genotyping that there is a 1 in 270,000 chance of this person not
being the person with DNA—I think that is gross overstatement—and so that
is definitely a concern of mine. I pay most attention in Daubert cases to the
cases where it really matters. And in criminal cases, particularly with
scientific evidence, it really matters a lot. So, I do think we have to pay
particular attention to that, but I think reliability does take care of that. I think
education is more important than putting something in the Rule.
JUDGE LEE: I think with regard to the proposed amendment to the Rule,
the one benefit it might have is that it does focus the adversarial process on
that issue of overstatement. As I’m looking through the Fordham summary
of the last symposium you guys had on forensic evidence,36 one of the things
that stuck out to me was that a lot of times those issues aren’t even brought
before me—so those arguments aren’t made. And I don’t know whether the
arguments aren’t made because of the strategic position of the lawyers or
what have you, but as judges, we can only deal with the objections that are
brought before us.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: You mean that defense counsel generally don’t
object to overstatements of forensic evidence?
JUDGE LEE: Right. They don’t object on overstatement. They don’t
raise the issue. They object on other grounds, but I have rarely seen, and in
criminal cases I’ve never seen, a defense lawyer object to an expert on the
notion that they are overstating the results or the reliability of the results. On
the civil side, I’ve seen that issue focused on as part of objections, and so it
all comes within the reliability rubric but it is not typically defined as
overstatement. So, if there is one particular benefit of an amendment, it
might be just to get the lawyers thinking about it more.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes. Right.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: If I could add one point to that. I had this opinion
in which I was fairly open about my feelings about Ninth Circuit Daubert
law.37 And my interpretation of Ninth Circuit Daubert law is that it is
actually quite forgiving of expert overstatement.38
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: And I think the Ninth Circuit is different from other
circuits, such as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in that regard.39 I agree
completely with Bill that there is plenty of room in the reliability inquiry for
a judge to strike an expert on overstatement grounds. But I wonder if
including it in the Rule would still have the potential to shake the
development of Daubert law.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: When you say the Ninth Circuit is forgiving—
are these cases where the Ninth Circuit will reverse and say “you shouldn’t
36. See generally Symposium, supra note 4.
37. See In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 3d 956, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 959–61 (comparing the reliability inquiry of the Ninth Circuit with other
circuits).
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have excluded the expert” after the district court judge has made a
determination about overstatement?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: That’s right.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: Can I ask a follow-up question?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Sure.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: One difference that concerns me a little bit about
the concept of overstatement in the Rule is the question of sufficient facts or
data, reliable principles and methods, and reliable application. From my
perspective as an appellate judge, I say, “Okay, was it an abuse of discretion,
the analysis of those things?” And those all ring in my mind—I’m going to
sound really like a law professor, sorry—those are all standards. So I ask my
students, “What’s a standard? Don’t drive at an unreasonable rate of speed.”
So, as an appellate court judge, I’m asking, “Did the district court judge abuse
discretion by making it essentially a determination that reliable principles
were employed when they weren’t?”—and that is a standard. So, there is a
range in which reasonable people might disagree about that. And so it is not
an abuse of discretion, I’ve heard, even though maybe there could have been
a little bit more reliability or a little bit less reliability. But overstatement
seems to be binary. You get it or you don’t get it. Maybe I’m
misunderstanding what overstatement means, but in some scientific
disciplines, I would think reliable principles and methods are not really
binary concepts.
JUDGE SARGUS: But I end up with a lot of Daubert motions that go not
to the admissibility of the opinion but to how it is given and what can be
testified to. So, at least in practice, someone who is overstating could be
directed—and this would be at a Daubert proceeding—that they can’t testify
to something that is stark. You are going to have to change the testimony.
Should I strike it? Or should I let the witness modify it?
And if I could go back to what Ms. Nester just mentioned, I’ve had more
problems with experts in criminal cases than civil. We have different
dockets—I get the whole range of cases. Once in a while, I’ll do a slip-andfall case with an expert who—whether they are an expert or not really is
questionable. But in criminal cases, too, what happens, particularly on the
low-end, for example, is that I get an illegal reentry case, the lowest level
felony in the federal system, and usually the sentence is time served if you
are convicted. We try this in a day. And I just had gotten a report from
Professor Capra about the DOJ policy on overstatement.40 We had a DOJ
expert in handwriting show up and had to walk through everything the policy
told him not to do—and he did every one of them. “This is reliable?” “Yep.”
“This is 100 percent reliable?” “Yep.” “There have never been two
40. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, AGENDA OF OCTOBER 25,
2019, at 131–64 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/advisory_committee_
on_rules_of_evidence_-_final_draft_agenda_book.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UYG-BRVY]. For
the Department of Justice’s uniform language for forensic scientists, see, for example,
Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
891366/download [https://perma.cc/9NKV-EDWJ].
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fingerprints of two different people ever established in world history?” I’m
like, “Wow this guy is really amazing.” [Laughter]
So, it’s out there. It’s a policy. But there was absolutely no objection, as
you mentioned. We had a long discussion about that during the course of the
trial thanks to your report, Professor Capra.
MS. SHAPIRO: Out of curiosity, when was that?
JUDGE SARGUS: The trial?
MS. SHAPIRO: Yes. When was this testimony?
JUDGE SARGUS: Last week.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Last week. Whoa. Thank you, Judge.
MS. LOVITT: I want to follow up on the Ninth Circuit question. Is the
issue one of application of reliability in the Ninth Circuit or a misapplication
of the admissibility standard versus weight and credibility?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: I guess it is hard to draw a line between those two.
It is more of a continuum. I think that Ninth Circuit law, if you put it in the
terms of Joiner—the gap between methodology and conclusion—I read
Ninth Circuit law as allowing a greater gap between methodology and
conclusion than some other circuits.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I think you are right about the overstatement in
the Ninth Circuit because there was a ballistics opinion in the Ninth Circuit
in 2017 which says it’s okay to say within a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty that this is a match, and that’s an overstatement.41
JUDGE CHHABRIA: I think it is important to note that there are different
kinds of overstatements. There is a fundamental overstatement, like, “I am
confident to a certainty that this substance caused this person’s cancer.” And
then there are overstatements that might be made in response to crossexamination, for example. I’ve had a situation where the expert says, “Well,
I believe this person’s cancer was caused by the substance” and then the
opposing lawyer cross-examines them with a bunch of hypotheticals saying,
“Would you believe if the facts were this or if the facts were that?” and they
might say, “yes, yes, yes,” and that might be an overreach. And in that case,
you might just say—and this is something I’ve done—“You can’t testify to
that at trial.” And, of course, if the other side wants to impeach you for
having said that in the Daubert hearing, they can. But you can’t testify. You
can give your base opinion, but you can’t testify to those extra matters.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: One of the proposals that we are looking at in
Rule 702 would add a phrase to the effect of “you cannot claim a degree of
confidence.”42 And you’ve mentioned overstatement comes in different
flavors. “Degree of confidence” seems to be a more limited approach.
What’s your reaction to that notion?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Can you clarify what you mean by degree of
confidence?

41. United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 2017).
42. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 40, at 63.
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JUDGE SARGUS: Such as a question: Are you certain of that? Lawyers
try to do that all the time.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes, something like, “I’m absolutely certain that
the substance caused the injury”—that kind of confidence.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: It’s a more limited concept than overstating
opinions that exceed the method.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Right. An example that might not fit within the
text of the proposed Rule but is an overstatement is that “this person was
three times as likely to get cancer because they were exposed to this product.”
Then you look at the studies and you say the studies don’t support that. That
might not fit within the language of what is being proposed.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: But that fits with what Judge Vance was talking
about: reliability in general. So, maybe this idea of degree of confidence
might be actually separate from the reliable application of a reliable method.
Confidence in the result might be a separate concept.
JUDGE VANCE: Right. I think it just depends on how you word it so
that judges know what you are trying to get at with this Rule that is different
from what they were doing before.
JUDGE ORRICK: I think that it is a great idea to focus on confidence in
the result. Because, one, we could use it just at trial. We don’t have to worry
about this adding some new sheen to Daubert and the motions. But it does
deal with a large swath of the overstatements that you get at trial. I think
that’s a good idea.
PROFESSOR CHENG: It seems awfully narrow to me if it is just about
prohibiting experts from saying, “I am absolutely certain about the particular
result.” I think that would make sense. Otherwise, I think it is easy to
misconstrue all of this language about overstatement. I completely agree
with Judge Chhabria about how there are different kinds of overstatement. I
think Ms. Nester’s view about a forensic match seems to be a clear
overstatement.
But if you are asking in a toxic tort case what overstatement is, I think it is
incredibly difficult. You have a multivariant regression and the expert
reaches a conclusion. Well, there are all kinds of places where one could say
that the expert was overstating the case because there is this physical
significance that you are worried about. But there is also the effect size that
you are worrying about and you are trying to figure out how strong a
conclusion you can draw based on the smaller sample size or the larger
sample size or whether there are possible confounders that you couldn’t get
at. All of that, I think, makes it almost impossible to say, except in very
extreme cases, that the expert is overstating the case. So, I understand what
the Committee is trying to root out, which is the match problem, or the “I am
100 percent certain.” Beyond those extreme cases, which to my mind seem
to be something you can deal with with education, I’m not sure that the Rule
itself won’t be misused once you have that out there.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Misused how? Everything that you talked about
is what Judge Chhabria was doing on the reliability requirements in the Rule.
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PROFESSOR CHENG: I think this goes back to what Judge Orrick had
said, which is that once you have this added to the Rule, then it becomes the
battleground. So everyone keeps arguing that this particular civil expert has
overstated here, overstated there. That wasn’t the Committee’s intent.
MS. SHAPIRO: Can I just ask one question? It’s a simplistic one, but if
you have a medical examiner testifying that the cause of death was
asphyxiation, would you allow that medical examiner to say: “I’m 100
percent sure. In my opinion—I’ve seen 10,000 of these cases—and in my
opinion, I am 100 percent sure that the cause of death is asphyxiation”?
Would that be permitted or is that too much confidence? Or is that an
overstatement?
JUDGE SARGUS: I get serious heartburn about that because there is no
margin of error, there is no peer review—all the things that Daubert talks
about. And this is hard scientific evidence. It’s not just some stray opinion.
But I think if I were the prosecutor using this medical examiner, I would go
through all the times there are conflicting factors and have to solve those.
Were there conflicting factors in this case? Was there any other mechanism
of death that you can think of that might have had an impact? Jurors can get
that. I just think if we get into this realm of impossibility, it’s overstatement.
MS. SHAPIRO: Right. I just wonder whether it is impossibility. That is
his opinion. In his opinion, this was the cause of death.
JUDGE SARGUS: You are pretty close to 100 percent certainty if
someone has a knife wound to their heart and otherwise they are in perfect
health. [Laughter] But it’s also unnecessary.
II. TOPIC TWO: INTERACTION OF EXPERTS AND JURORS
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, I’d like to move on to how we expose jurors
to different kinds of experts. And one of the confounding things about
Daubert is experience-based experts—experts on industry standards, experts
on how restaurants use tipping policies, experts on police practices. And so
when you get an expert like that, how do you approach it? What do you make
them do? I mean, when they say, “I look at it and this is my conclusion.” I
see in the opinions of the panelists that you require them to explain how they
reached their conclusion, but it seems to be a very difficult process. What
about a person who says, “I know all about police practices,” for example?
JUDGE SARGUS: My experience is that, assuming this person has thirty
years of work experience and maybe has published some articles and given
some training, the grind there isn’t admissibility versus inadmissibility. It’s
the framing of the opinion: staying away from deliberate indifference or
legal conclusions. We end up spending a lot of time sorting through what is
permissible and what is essentially mixing law and fact in an impermissible
way.
JUDGE ORRICK: I think another thing you look at with those folks is
how much experience do they have that is broad-based and how much of it
is specific to the individual case? So, in one of the cases that I had, the gang
expert that the prosecution wanted was the guy who had been investigating
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this particular gang.43 He knew a lot about this particular gang and some
other gangs in the neighborhood but he didn’t have the broad-based
knowledge that was going to be helpful.44 So, I didn’t let him testify.45 In
the old days, you would bring in the dad who was the carpenter and the dad
would testify about how you do these particular things and that would qualify
as an expert opinion. I think you just have to stay away from those people
who are sort of tightly tied to the case who are offered as experience-based
experts.
JUDGE SARGUS: Did they bring the expert in under Rule 70146 or 702
in the gang case?
JUDGE ORRICK: That’s a good question. I don’t know the answer to
that question.
JUDGE SARGUS: I find that we get that confused all the time.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: In criminal cases, there are many cases where the
prosecution divides it up so there is a Rule 701 witness and a Rule 702
witness. For example, one expert testifies to how the Crips operate in general
and then the person who infiltrated the particular gang testifies about how
that gang’s operations match that of the broader group.
JUDGE ORRICK: In my case, the witness was going to be testifying both
ways. I let him testify to the facts that he knew but did not let him give
opinion testimony with respect to those facts.47
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Vance?
JUDGE VANCE: Another thing that you can do sometimes with
experience-based experts, say plumbers and electricians, is to determine
whether or not there are some standards that they can look at—like maybe
OSHA standards, local plumbing codes, or best practices in the plumbing
industry to see if they have used any of that. I’m always looking at whether
or not they can point to something objective that supports their opinion other
than, “I’m an expert, I’m experienced, I’ve looked at that and this is what I
think.” And so, sometimes, if you can find some objective standards
somewhere in a code or that he’s using, that is helpful.
And then on the policing point, the American Law Institute is working on
a project on policing best practices.48 If that gets approved down the road,
that could be source that the court and the expert could consult to provide
some sort of standard as to whether or not the opinion is grounded in what
experts think are the best practices. But I don’t think we should give up on
looking around to see if there is something that should govern these
experience-based experts. And often they could test the experts, too, if they

43. See generally United States v. Williams, No. 13-cr-00764-WHO, 2016 WL 899145
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2016).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. FED. R. EVID. 701 (governing opinion testimony by lay witnesses).
47. See generally Williams, 2016 WL 899145.
48. See, e.g., Principles of the Law: Policing, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/projects/
show/police-investigations [https://perma.cc/2GQ4-TU8C] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
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wanted to—but they just don’t. Sometimes experts say that it’s just
experience, but it is something courts really could test if they chose to do it.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Lee?
JUDGE LEE: I think that with experience-based experts, you definitely
focus on their qualifications more than a scientific expert and you really try
to get to the bottom of what their experience is. Does their experience relate
to the opinions that they can offer? The other thing I try to think about is
whether the topic is within the realm of a scientific expert. Is this experiential
expert trying to take the place of a scientific expert? In other words, is this
an area where a scientific expert could actually offer this type of testimony?
An example would be a case involving race tires. The question is whether or
not a particular tread design was better in wet driving than others. And so,
you could have a race car driver come in and say, “I drive cars all the time
and I have driven these tires and in my experience these tires are better at
handling in particular circumstances.” Or you could have an engineer come
in and testify to that. So, I try to figure out if the experts are testifying in an
area that science has dealt with.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And then what do you do? Do you say, “I want
an engineer instead of this experience-based expert”?
JUDGE LEE: That allows me then to dive into what standards apply. Are
they aware of these engineering standards? Are they aware that this was done
and that this was looked at? What is their knowledge about alternative tread
designs and how are they factored in?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Great point. Some of the opinions I’ve read from
the panel about experience-based experts indicate that you tend to look at
where the expert is relying on sufficient facts or data—such as whether they
actually went to investigate the accident scene or whether they conducted
basic tests. Maybe that’s a possible way of regulating the potential that the
experience-based expert is merely providing an ipse dixit.
PROFESSOR CHENG: Is the idea then that reliability under Daubert is
relative depending on what kind of evidence is out there versus absolute—
which sometimes people think Daubert requires?
JUDGE VANCE: Everything is relative.
JUDGE SARGUS: That is true when you get into a bigger policy picture,
particularly in mass torts. If we are talking about absolute scientific certainty,
then that means one hundred years from now. If anybody was injured this
year, they go without any sort of proof of a claim. So, I think Daubert is
trying to strike that reasonable balance of requiring enough science that it is
not junk science. But if we are waiting for scientific certainty, of course, it
is never going to happen. And second, to get even close to that, decades will
go by without people being able to recover for injuries. So, it’s a difficult
balance.
PROFESSOR CHENG: And just to clarify my statement, it is the idea that
the level of rigor that you require depends on what is out there at the moment,
or what you can get at the moment.
JUDGE SARGUS: Yes. I agree with that.
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JUDGE LIVINGSTON: And so, if the best we can do is the race car driver
who says “I have driven in the rain many, many times and these tires are
better than the other,” that may need to be sufficient for this case.
JUDGE VANCE: But why would it have to be sufficient if it’s not good
enough? I mean, if it is not enough to support the opinion—just because
there is nothing else, it doesn’t mean you need to allow an unreliable expert
to testify. You just don’t have a case.
JUDGE SARGUS: That is true. And Daubert may require that in some
cases. But if it is somehow within the permissible Daubert spectrum and that
is all you have, that goes to the issue of probative value and you do the 403
balance.49 It’s the only thing that you have.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: There is case law regarding experience-based
experts that states Daubert doesn’t really apply or doesn’t apply in the same
way to such experts or that the Daubert factors are not relevant.50 So, there
is a lot of flexibility, I guess.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: Do you think that Daubert has liberalized the
admission of expert testimony in the main or do you think it’s made it harder
to get experts admitted?
JUDGE VANCE: Oh, it’s made it harder. Daubert was like the summary
judgment motion trilogy.51 They did more to signal than what they actually
said. I think, once again, the Court sent a signal, particularly in Joiner and
in how Kumho Tire was applied, and gave an indication saying that it is
liberalized because we are looking at more than just general acceptance. But
the way it is actually applied, I think, has made it much more restrictive.
PROFESSOR CAPRA:
And especially extending the reliability
requirement to nonscientific experts.
JUDGE VANCE: Yes.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And the whole gatekeeping function—that has
been much stricter.
JUDGE VANCE: I totally agree.

49. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Valdes, 681 F. App’x 874, 881 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding
that Daubert was inapplicable to an experience-based firearms identification expert); United
States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 173, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “the factors in Daubert
were intended to apply to the evaluation of scientific testimony, and they ha[d] little bearing”
on the testimony of an experience-based narcotics expert); see also First Tenn. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Barreto, 268 F.3d 319, 334 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that Daubert “may be of limited
utility in the context of non-scientific expert testimony”).
51. In 1986, the Supreme Court decided three cases focusing on the summary judgment
standard. See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
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III. TOPIC THREE: GENERAL AND SPECIFIC CAUSATION EXPERTS
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, next topic. How about specific causation and
general causation in tort cases? I would first like to talk about how to separate
the two. I mean, conceptually of course, they are separated. But obviously
they get gnarled up together. So, I would like to start with Judge Sargus, who
had the question of separating out general and specific causation experts, and
Judge Chhabria, who had this issue as well.
JUDGE SARGUS: Well, let me first thank Judge Vance for giving me
3500 cases involving this.52 [Laughter]
As judges and lawyers, it is so easy to differentiate those two terms,
general and specific causation. But there is a fine line. These 3500 cases
came out of a class action settlement, and in the settlement, there was a
science panel created.53 DuPont was the defendant and paid for the expenses
of the panel.54 It agreed that if the science panel found a link between the
chemical used in the manufacture of Teflon and particular diseases, then
DuPont would not contest general causation.55 They could contest specific
causation. The terms were not any further defined than general versus
specific. So, as we tee up the first Daubert issue, you’ve got a urologist in a
kidney cancer case who says there is no way there is any specific causation
here because the plaintiff’s water system didn’t have a sufficient level of this
chemical in it to make it a specific cause.56 But that is testimony as to general
causation. The science panel had already determined that there was general
causation at that level. So, it became a Daubert issue on the question of “fit.”
And I struck the opinion, finding that general causation was off the table.57
If the expert revisits general causation problems to find no specific causation,
the contract that DuPont entered into prohibited that. So, it’s easy to
differentiate general and specific causation in theory, but those concepts
bleed together in ways that make Daubert issues more complicated.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: They bleed together in a fundamental way. If you
are doing a differential diagnosis to find specific causation, you have to rule
in a particular cause, and that is the general causation question, right? Isn’t
that the problem?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Yes. General causation is part of the analysis of
whether something caused a particular disease in a particular person—that is
very important. And it is actually one of the things I wish I had done better

52. Judge Vance is the former chair of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, which is responsible for sending MDL proceedings to particular judges. See Roster
of Current and Former Judges of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
U.S. CTS.,
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Current_Former_Judges_of_
the%20Panel-10-16-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK7K-4MF6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).
53. See generally In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig. (DuPont),
337 F. Supp. 3d 728 (S.D. Ohio 2015).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 734.
56. See id. at 734–37.
57. See generally id.
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in the Monsanto Roundup case.58 And I’ll say a couple of things about that.
The case is ongoing, so I need to be a little bit careful about what I say, but
everything I’m about to say is in the public record already. I made a decision
to phase the pretrial litigation, look at general causation first, take expert
testimony on general causation, and make a decision whether the plaintiffs
made it past the hurdle of general causation. If they couldn’t present
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that this product is
capable of causing cancer, then they automatically lose and all 2000 of the
plaintiffs—
JUDGE VANCE: Don’t look at me. [Laughter]
JUDGE CHHABRIA: —that Sarah sent me would lose. And then if they
get past that, we do specific causation then. I think it always depends on the
case. It is often worth phasing it that way, or at least sometimes it’s worth
phasing it that way. I’m glad that I did it. But there are a couple of things I
wish I had done differently. One is that you’ve got to pin down the parties
on what they mean by general causation, and the problem that I had was that
the plaintiffs’ experts came in and were arguing, essentially, that Roundup is
capable of causing cancer in the abstract.59 And the defendants were coming
in and saying, “Well, Roundup is not capable of causing cancer in the kinds
of exposures that people are experiencing in the real world today.”60 So,
there is a little bit of a disconnect in the testimony of the competing experts.
We spent a lot of time hashing that out during the Daubert hearings, and that
is something that I wish I would have guided everyone to reach a meeting of
the minds on early in the proceeding. Precisely what do we mean by general
causation? And I sided with the defendants on that question—general
causation is conditioned on exposure that could realistically occur.61 That
has to be what general causation means, but it forced the plaintiffs’ experts
to tweak what they were doing, which raised a whole different set of issues.
And then another thing I wish I would have done better is to think more
carefully about the issue that you have identified, Dan, which is when a
specific causation expert comes in and the foundation of their opinion is the
general causation point—and it’s part and parcel of the same opinion. But if
the parties are going to be able to bring in specific causation experts later,
and that will include testimony about general causation, then what is the point
of phasing it in the first place? What is the point of having the first phase
where all you are doing is focusing on general causation? Maybe that is an
argument against phasing. What I ended up doing in my case was to say,
“I’m sorry, Monsanto, I know you want to bring these specific causation
experts in and you want them to give a whole new opinion on general
causation, but you are the ones who asked for this case to be phased and you
are the ones who argued that we’ve got to do general causation first.” And
58.
59.
2018).
60.
61.

See generally In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 3d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
See generally In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 390 F. Supp. 3d 1102 (N.D. Cal.
See generally id.
See id. at 1108.
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so I said, “Your specific causation experts must merely piggyback off of the
general causation experts and can’t reargue the point of general causation in
the form of a conclusion on specific causation.” But I think that was a little
uncomfortable for the specific causation experts to do because they are
accustomed to explaining why they rule something in and then explaining
why they rule something out. So, it was a difficulty. And, again, it’s just
something that I wish I had gotten ahead of after I made the decision to phase
the case.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, it was like in Judge Sargus’s case, where the
defense experts were ruling out specific causation and basically rearguing
general causation?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: That’s how I saw it, yes.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Lee had a case where the specific and the
general causation melded together as well. It was the asbestos case.62 Do
you want to talk about how that worked out?
JUDGE LEE: Sure. This was a case that I received after it went through
the MDL process—an asbestos case. And the issue was that the plaintiff’s
expert had this very broad opinion and, in the end, at a Daubert hearing, I got
the plaintiff’s expert to state what his opinion was, which was really reliant
upon the “any exposure” theory—so that a single fiber of asbestos is enough
to trigger injury.63 And so, the question was, is that scientifically reliable?
Is there enough information out there? And what I came to understand is
that, in asbestos cases, there are basically the same three experts that are
packaged together, and they just go from trial to trial to trial to trial. And
they don’t incorporate any of the particular facts of a particular case. They
just have their general opinions that are applicable to all of their cases.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Because they don’t need to particularize given
their theory. It is enough that any individual lives in a universe with asbestos,
right?
JUDGE LEE: Exactly. So, we had a Daubert hearing, and I ended up
striking that expert because there was no opinion about the dosage that
caused the injury, how much was necessary to cause the injury, and no
particularized analysis of the exposure in the case at hand.64 So that was an
example of amalgamation of general and specific causation.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: I would be interested in whether you all agree with
the idea that what we are talking about now is primarily a case management
issue. I’ve had the same situation where I excluded general causation
experts. The party who successfully excluded them moved for summary
judgment and the plaintiffs came back and said, “No, our specific causation
experts can also cover general causation.” That is a case management issue
where you say, “No, you had your opportunity to disclose general causation
experts, you didn’t disclose these people as general causation experts, the
deadline for disclosing them has passed, the general causation experts you
62. See generally Krik v. Crane Co., 76 F. Supp. 3d 747 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
63. See id. at 750–55.
64. See id.
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disclosed have been excluded, and you can’t use these undisclosed people to
address general causation.” That seems to me to be as much a case
management issue as a Rule 702 issue.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: It is a case management issue, but it is about how
to manage the case in a way that is going to give you the best ability to get at
the truth and to put you in the best position to examine the scientific evidence
in the most effective way. So I don’t know if I see a clear distinction between
the label of a case management question and the label of a 702 question.
JUDGE VANCE: I think it would be helpful if at the Rule 1665 conference
you ferreted out what these experts propose to do and how much overlap
there is and make clear that general causation is going up once. So, if your
specific causation experts intend to rely on their general causation
conclusions, you better throw their general causation opinions in the mix
when I’m deciding that because I’m not doing it twice. Ferret that out in the
beginning. And then I think you are perfectly entitled to cut off the specific
causation experts if they gravitate toward general causation.
JUDGE SARGUS: In simpler cases, the Daubert motions that I see are in
conjunction with the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. So if the
general causation expert is knocked out, the case is over.
JUDGE VANCE: It really helps, I think, to get the parties in early and to
talk about the experts, to try to get them to get rid of overlapping experts, to
tell them there is going to be one Daubert motion per expert and not fifteen,
and to make really clear if you can understand the expertise that they are
going to be talking about to find how this is going to be structured going
forward. You can always change it, but I think it helps to try to sort that out
early on in the case.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Well, the bifurcation works really well if you find
they didn’t have general causation. It gets more complicated when you find
to the contrary.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: That’s for sure.
JUDGE VANCE: Then they settle a lot of times. [Laughter]
IV. TOPIC FOUR: UNIFORMITY—HOW DIFFERENT COURTS ADDRESS
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN DAUBERT DECISIONS
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, I want to go for a couple of minutes to the
question of uniformity. We have a code of evidence that is ideally to be
uniformly applied. But there are a lot of situations where there are conflicting
decisions on the same evidentiary question regarding expert testimony. As
we have already been talking about MDLs, I will start with Judge Vance and
ask about the principle of uniformity in Daubert decisions in MDLs and
beyond.
JUDGE VANCE: One of the things that the MDL panel looks at in cases
where there are going to be expert issues is whether or not the Daubert issues
are going to overlap. We look at it for two reasons. One is the possibility of
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
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conflicting rulings and the mess that can make and the duplication of effort
of judges all deciding these complex Daubert motions so that it is often more
efficient to have them decided by one judge. That is not the only reason an
MDL may be formed. An MDL may not be formed when that is a factor, but
it is something that is considered in the formation of an MDL—whether it is
going to be Daubert-intensive and whether there is a possibility that you
would have forty, fifty, sixty, eighty judges in the country deciding the same
question. But having said that, even if you have an MDL, you often have the
Daubert issues coming up in state court, too. And what MDL judges do
sometimes is they try to coordinate Daubert/Frye practice with the state court
judges where you might have a joint “science day” where the state court
judge is invited to come in and hear the scientific presentation. The state and
federal court might agree upon discovery protocols to try to get the timing in
sync. It might be an agreement on who goes first on a hearing or maybe even
doing a joint hearing. I know Judge Fallon in my court has done a joint
Frye/Daubert hearing with state court judges where they listened to the
Daubert evidence all at once and had a joint hearing.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So even though the state court had different
standards—
JUDGE VANCE: They applied different standards, but they listened to
the same presentation. And so there are ways that you can try to coordinate
the process, and hopefully judges will see things the same way. But if they
don’t, that’s why you’ve got a court of appeals.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I guess that the broader question of uniformity,
beyond the MDL procedure, is what do you do if you are reviewing a Daubert
decision and you disagree with precedent on the same expert testimony that
you are reviewing? For example, Judge Orrick, when you reviewed expert
testimony on DNA extraction, there was case law that accepted it under
Daubert, and you rejected it.66 I guess, the goal is to reach uniformity, but
what are the limits to uniformity?
JUDGE ORRICK: In the end, I’m doing the right thing. The DNA issues
that I had—they weren’t really conflicting opinions. I drilled down in the
hearing and found a lot of the inability of the lab to have been validated.
There were a number of different fact-specific issues there. When I see
different opinions about expert testimony that the guy has been giving across
the country—
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Like that one, right? Where the expert had been
excluded in four courts?
JUDGE ORRICK: Right.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Or admitted in four courts?
JUDGE ORRICK: I pay attention when my colleagues have struck
somebody. Then I probably dig a little harder to see whether I want to agree
with them. I’m always swayed when people around the country have been
doing something, particularly if they have been doing it consistently.
66. See United States v. Williams, 382 F. Supp. 3d 928, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

2020]

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES

1241

JUDGE LEE: I think for me, it’s definitely a data point, those other
decisions, but in the end, I would say that I try to do what’s right in that I try
to come to the right decision—and a decision that the subsequent court would
also agree with. And so that is really the driving force. When we had this
whole “single fiber,” “any exposure” theory, there had been so much written
about it, so much litigation—cases all over the place. And in the end, after
reading the cases, I just try to come to what I think is the right result. I think
that, in the end, over time, the right result will end up being the uniform
result.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Dan, I don’t know if I’m allowed to ask you a
question, but I guess the question is—you said the goal is to reach
uniformity—
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That’s the goal.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Why?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That’s why we have the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Why is the goal to reach uniformity? I mean—
PROFESSOR CAPRA: It’s a big country and everybody should get the
same Rule. That’s the goal.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: What about percolation? I mean, our legal system
is based, in part, on the idea that there will be percolation of issues and maybe
it is okay that district courts are disagreeing about issues and that will help to
flesh out different ideas and ultimately allow the court system to get the right
answer.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I get that point. But when it comes to evidence
rules, they should be written so that percolation should not be necessary with
the evidence rule because the evidence rule should be clear, and there
shouldn’t be much dispute about them. That’s the goal. It’s the utopian goal,
Judge.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Meaning that the goal should be that the Daubert
ruling in the Northern District of California should be the same as the
Daubert ruling in the Southern District of Florida?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: On the same expert with the same opinion making
the same showing, yes. That should be the goal. And that goal is hard to
effectuate where you have got the Ninth Circuit, as you put it, with a more
liberal attitude toward expert testimony than some other circuits. It is an
impossible goal if the circuits are setting different standards.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: With respect to uniformity, I came across a very
interesting and difficult question that I don’t think anybody has grappled with
yet, and it relates to the MDL process. I, of course, have all of these cases
from all over the country, right? And I’m conducting this Daubert inquiry
sitting in the Northern District of California within the Ninth Circuit. So,
should I be emphasizing Ninth Circuit law for all of those cases? Or should
I only be emphasizing Ninth Circuit law for the cases that originated in the
Ninth Circuit? Should I be placing greater weight on Fourth Circuit law for
the cases that came from North Carolina? And sometimes the answer to that
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question might be outcome determinative because the circuits will squarely
disagree on the admissibility of expert testimony.
JUDGE VANCE: But that is true in MDLs. If I have an MDL in the Fifth
Circuit, you are going to get this clash of law, which does not make people
happy. Summary judgment standards are going to be the Fifth Circuit
standards regardless of where this case came from and you are going to apply
the law of the circuit.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: But is that fair?
JUDGE VANCE: Well, that’s a different question. And it has been
discussed.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: —that the MDL assignment could be outcome
determinative?
JUDGE VANCE: Well, why do you think we can get two hundred people
in an auditorium arguing about where to send the case?
JUDGE SARGUS: I have 6000 hernia mesh cases from forty-nine
states.67 I’m all for uniformity. [Laughter]
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Well, you can’t specifically identify a clear
distinction between Ninth Circuit law and Fifth Circuit law on Daubert. It’s
just more of a feel, right?
JUDGE VANCE: Nuance.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: So, do you apply a different nuance to different
cases? And I ended up saying, “No, you don’t do that.” But I actually think
that is a very hard question, and it’s not clear to me that uniformity should
trump the notion of the plaintiff getting the benefit of the law where they filed
the case.
JUDGE SARGUS: And it is far beyond Daubert. The same question
arises for any number of procedural rules and standards on which the circuits
do not agree.
JUDGE VANCE: Of course, the plaintiff would get the benefit of state
law on any state law substantive claims. But as far as procedure, it gets
federal procedure and as long as I have been affiliated with the panel, you’ve
got to have one procedure because otherwise you would be applying Seventh
Circuit law to this and Fourth Circuit law to that. It would just—you think
you’ve got it bad with 2000 cases. [Laughter] It would be even worse.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: But it did make me wonder. I was thinking about
this question and I was also thinking about the issue of percolation versus
uniformity. It’s not obvious to me that uniformity is the only interest that we
have here in this MDL context. But it made me wonder, maybe your 3500
cases should have been spread around to nine different judges in nine
different circuits. Maybe they should have stayed within the circuit.
JUDGE SARGUS: I’ll vote for that. [Laughter]
JUDGE VANCE: That’s a different discussion.

67. See generally In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh Prods.
Liab. Litig., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2018) (mem.).
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: That is an excellent discussion. We are going to
take a ten-minute break and we will start again. Thank you so much.
[Break]
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Before we start on another topic, Judge Sargus
would like to provide a small clarification on his earlier argument about a
government expert making an overstated conclusion on fingerprints in his
court.
JUDGE SARGUS: Yes. I mistakenly referred to an expert as a DOJ
employee. He was an ICE employee, so he was not subject to the DOJ
guidelines on overstatement of forensic expert opinions.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Your point about overstatement, though, is still
well-taken, Judge Sargus. Experts who are not covered by the DOJ
guidelines are still called by federal prosecutors to provide overstated
opinions on forensic issues.
V. TOPIC FIVE: REVIEWING DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS TESTIMONY UNDER
DAUBERT
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I would like to continue our conversation about
specific and general causation by turning to some cases in which experts
conduct a differential diagnosis to determine a specific cause and it is agreed
by the parties that some possible causes for the plaintiff’s condition are
unknown. It seems very difficult to come to a conclusion about a particular
cause by ruling out other causes, where some of those causes are unknown.
How do you review such testimony under Daubert?
JUDGE SARGUS: I have a long opinion on that.68
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes, I know you do.
JUDGE SARGUS: So, there were two types of cancer in these cases. One
was kidney cancer and one was testicular. Both of them have a series of
known risk factors, as most cancers do. And then there are a number of cases
reported as having unknown causes, unknown etiology, idiopathy. So, that’s
the defense word, idiopathic. So, if you had 80 percent of the cases with
unknown etiology and you try to do a differential diagnosis, what does that
do?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes.
JUDGE SARGUS: But of course, idiopathic means, in a scientific sense,
“we don’t know” as opposed to “there is no cause.” Those two concepts are
completely separate, and in the kidney cancer case where I first got into this,
there are known risk factors. There is an age factor, there is a race factor,
there are some behavioral factors, some hereditary factors, and the doctor
who was the specific causation expert for plaintiff went through each of these
and ruled them out. Then we get back to general causation. He also relied
upon a science panel study that was a huge epidemiology effort involving
70,000 people tested and found that the defendant’s chemical is a known
cause. So, he could conclude that it was more likely than not that the kidney
68. See generally DuPont, 337 F. Supp. 3d 728 (S.D. Ohio 2015).
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cancer was caused by ingesting the chemical in the water supply. So, it’s a
difficult issue theoretically. I don’t think it’s unduly difficult in practice.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Is the idea just to rule out the known causes and
just leave the unknown causes to the jury? Is that how it worked?
JUDGE SARGUS: Well, on cross he was certainly asked, “Are many of
the people you see with kidney cancer without a known cause?” But his
comeback was that they didn’t drink this water, either. And this water has
chemicals in it linked to kidney cancer. Other witnesses established all that
as a known connection to the cancer at issue. So, his argument was that we
might not have a known cause in most cases. But we do here.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, how does that work? If you have the plaintiff
in front of you, the doctor doesn’t know if it was caused by the water or if he
is one of the 80 percent of people who get it from some other cause. How
can he say it’s the water when a whole bunch of people get it from other
unknown causes? How do you know he is not one of those?
JUDGE SARGUS: So, what he would say is that you look at risk factors,
and thanks to a lot of science on this, you could take—I’ll take the testicular
case because I’ve tried more of those. It could be genetic. It could be from
HIV. It could be from hardening of the testicles. You can rule all those out
first. So, it’s not just an idiopathic versus chemical exposure. There are other
known risk factors. And then it is a “more likely than not” analysis in which
you put all these risk factors together. He’s had this water in his system for
years and so it is more likely that it was the cause than an unknown cause,
given the absence of risk factors.
JUDGE VANCE: What did the epidemiological study show on the level
of association?
JUDGE SARGUS: We had big fights about that. And these cases are still
pending, so like Judge Chhabria, I’ve got to be a little careful here. The
parties picked a level: 0.1 part per billion in the water. If you had that in
your drinking water, it was all testable for years. For more than a year, they
would test all of these sixty conditions that were alleged in the class action
and then the science panel would do an up-or-down. Either it’s linked or it’s
not. And we had a lot of fights because, of the 90,000 people in the class,
3500 of them had one of the conditions. The other 86,500 all had their claims
dismissed with prejudice. So, one of the arguments DuPont made was that
we get to look at the cohorts, and they put them into quartiles. The risk went
down for some and up for others. They wanted to be able to argue that. But
the agreement said that you are either in or you are out, and if you are in, you
get the benefit of a finding of general causation. So, the dosage for general
causation was not an issue.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: We had this issue of unknown causes come up in
the Roundup case69 as well. I think the problem that you are getting at, Judge
Campbell, is—let’s say you had a situation where everything has been ruled
out except for one thing, but the disease has a high rate of idiopathy. So, is
69. See generally In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 358 F. Supp. 3d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
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it okay for an expert to say, for a disease with a high rate of idiopathy, “Once
I have ruled everything else out—and there is only one risk factor that I can’t
rule out—it is automatically that risk factor that caused the disease”? What
I said in my ruling was that probably would not be okay and, to the extent
that the experts mean to imply that, they can’t say that. But what the experts
did say was that, because I haven’t ruled out Roundup and because the
plaintiff was exposed to such a significant extent to this risk factor, I can
conclude specific causation more likely than not. These were plaintiffs who
had been really using a lot of it over a large number of years. What I ruled
is that that opinion is permissible because it was combined with the exposure
data, the exposure information.
JUDGE SARGUS: Going back to Judge Campbell’s point—it was a good
one. In our case, we had general causation established. I think that made a
big difference. Without that, you really can’t get the specific causation with
idiopathy present. I think that is where you get the problem.
VI. TOPIC SIX: CREDIBILITY, RELIABILITY, AND EXPERTS WHO RELY ON
THE WORK OF OTHER EXPERTS
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Thank you. So, I would like to move on to a
different issue. Sometimes what I see in cases is that there is an expert who
is testifying on the basis of work that is being done by somebody else. For
example, the expert testifies about a survey and they are not actually heavily
involved in the survey. The survey is being done by other people who are
specialists and the adversary doesn’t get to cross-examine or depose those
underlying people. You get this kind of capstone expert. How do you treat
that? Of course, experts can rely on all sorts of information. But at some
point, you have to wonder if they are just a mouthpiece. I know that Judge
Lee had something on that in his jurisprudence, so I thought I would ask him
to start off.
JUDGE LEE: So, in the Seventh Circuit, we have this case called Dura,70
which addresses the issue about experts relying upon other experts and what
needs to be done by the trial court under Daubert. I dealt with this most in
environmental contexts. For example, you have a hydrogeologist that also
relies upon soil sampling that is taken by other experts, or the case that I think
Dan proffered, that the EEOC brought against DHL and the EEOC presented
a statistician to look at the various DHL driver routes.71 The allegation was
that the driver routes were allocated in a racially discriminatory manner.72
The statistician relied upon a company that specializes basically in
geostatistics. And so, they took the routes, they put them into a commercially
available software program that parsed out all the routes and where they
went, and they put it in a spreadsheet that the expert could review. The issue
was that the EEOC did not disclose that geostatistician and that company.
70. See generally Dura Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2002).
71. See generally EEOC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., No. 10 C 6139, 2016 WL 5796890,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016).
72. See id. at *1.
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The DHL attorneys came in and objected, saying, “Look, we don’t have an
expert report from the geostatistician. We don’t know how reliable their
work is.”73 The EEOC’s expert statistician argued, in response, that
statisticians rely upon these types of underlying statistics all the time, so no
disclosure of the underlying experts was necessary.74
In the end, I looked at the software—it was commercially available and
the framework I had in my mind in that particular case was similar to the
framework that I use in evaluating compilations of admissible evidence under
Rule 1006.75 The question was, “What sort of judgment was the underlying
expert using?” Was it just simply gathering some data using a commercially
available, widely used software—just entering it in—or were there
judgments made about what data gets in and what data does not? Are they
tweaking the data? And so, in that case I thought that they were more of a
compiler of information, basically a 1006 witness.
But I’ve had cases in the environmental context where the expert was just
kind of a figurehead—for example, a hydrogeologist relying upon soil
samples taken by other companies. Oftentimes, what happens is that a
company that does remediation has historical soil samples done by other
companies and so the new expert comes in, adopts those results, and then
builds upon them. Then the question becomes, “Well, what about the prior
data?” And, of course, the hydrogeologist’s argument is that they rely upon
soil samples all the time. And then the question becomes, “Should the
defendants have an opportunity to cross-examine the soil sample people?”
And if they don’t, what does that mean? And in that context, I did end up
striking that portion of the expert’s testimony. When I looked at the soil data
and the gathering methodology—and there was some dispute as to whether
or not they looked at the right samples—where the samples were taken, and
the fact that the main expert couldn’t really testify as to those issues, I thought
it was necessary for the defendant challenging a soil sampling to have
someone come in and try to defend it. They couldn’t find anyone, so I ended
up striking it.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, there is a line somewhere to be drawn there,
depending on what the underlying expert is doing. Very interesting.
VII. TOPIC SEVEN: JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING VERSUS JURY FACT-FINDING
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, the next issue I would like to discuss comes
right out of Daubert, where the Court states that what a judge is supposed to
do as a gatekeeper is not to assess the expert’s credibility but their
methodology.76 So, credibility of the expert would be for the jury. I’m just
wondering what the judges think of that, because I think you do take into
73. See id. at *5.
74. See id.
75. FED. R. EVID. 1006 (providing that a “proponent may use a summary, chart, or
calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that
cannot be conveniently examined in court”).
76. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594–95 (1993).
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account an expert’s credibility in a number of situations. Judge Vance, can
you start us off on how the credibility of an expert might actually become an
issue in a Daubert hearing?
JUDGE VANCE: I think the issues of credibility and methodology do
bleed together and sometimes there are two phases of the same question. I
had an issue with an exposure expert who made an estimate of the exposure
to gasoline that the plaintiff had a few years ago—that according to a study
in his own report was enough to kill you in six minutes.77 The exposure
expert estimated that the plaintiff was exposed to this amount of gasoline for
hours over more than a year and that he was about one-and-a-half times the
lethal level in the expert’s estimate.78 And yet nobody died of toxic gasoline
exposure. So the expert’s testimony about exposure was completely
contradicted by the facts in the case. When he was confronted with it in the
Daubert process, he wanted to withdraw the opinion. And I said, “Okay, you
can withdraw the opinion but you did present the opinion, and this speaks to
a low level of intellectual rigor. It says something about how you approach
analyzing and collecting data, and so I think it is relevant to your overall
analysis.”79 Is that the same thing as saying “If you did this, I can’t believe
anything else you are going to do”? Not exactly, but it’s sort of like that. If
that had been the only problem with that expert, it wouldn’t have been
dispositive, but that lack of rigor was part of a pattern that all went in the
same direction that contributed to his exclusion.
I had another case where a social worker diagnosed a policeman with
PTSD after he choked on a chicken bone in a chicken soft taco and he also
said he had erectile dysfunction and a lot of other problems.80 And this social
worker didn’t find out that the policeman had lost a mother and a brother the
same year, that he still goes back to the same Taco Bell, he still eats chicken
soft tacos, and he never passed out from the choking incident. When
confronted with all of this, the social worker said that it was still his opinion
that he had PTSD from choking on a chicken bone in a chicken soft taco,
even though he is a policeman, he carries a gun every day, and he is exposed
to all kinds of risks.81 So, whether or not that was a credibility call or a
reliability call, I excluded the expert.82 And I said he didn’t interpose any
professional judgment on what he was hearing when he considered this
information and came up with this conclusion. It just was not something that
I thought I could not let in—whether that was a credibility call or not.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Orrick?
JUDGE ORRICK: I think that credibility and reliability here are the same
thing, in that you would not allow somebody who could not testify reliably—
as in Judge Vance’s situation. I had a DNA expert from an accredited lab
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See generally Burst v. Shell Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 3d 773, 780 (E.D. La. 2015).
See id.
See id. at 780–81.
Lassiegne v. Taco Bell Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 512, 514, 516 (E.D. La. 2012).
See id. at 519–22.
Id. at 524–25.
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who testified hundreds of times in federal court. He testified in a Daubert
hearing about—there was a double murder and a small amount of DNA, very
small.83 He got results below the stochastic threshold and applied his
conclusions from that and considered them inconsistently.84 He enhanced
because there wasn’t very much DNA. He enhanced the DNA but he didn’t
do it using the protocols that his lab—he owned the lab—had established so
that he could double them up.85 Then he didn’t take any notes on how he had
drawn his conclusions.86 So, to me, that was a fairly simple call. Whether
that was credibility or reliability, I didn’t let him go on.87
JUDGE SARGUS: And that’s what makes these rules interesting, to see
the range of experts we are talking about. In MDL cases, there is usually a
lot of money involved and the experts tend to be at the top of their field, so
you are not going to get somebody with a prior felony conviction or someone
who has been excluded as an expert in five other jurisdictions. You can get
other issues. In the middle of these DuPont cases, the main specific causation
expert, who was head of an oncology department at a very good hospital and
was also in charge of residents, basically got kicked out of a position for
being abusive to residents there. He told all the females, “You are here for
two years, don’t even think about having a baby.” And the school dumped
him. He is still a doctor. That had nothing to do with his opinions or his
medical practice. You’ve got two issues. One, are his actions relevant to a
Daubert review? I found they were irrelevant, because they did not go to the
credibility of his opinion.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I think you are right about that.
JUDGE SARGUS: The second issue is, could they use it against him in
cross? Another hard issue. My experience has usually been with people who
are in the medical business and their credentials are pretty hard to assail.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: I just want to quickly agree with what everybody
has said. You know, the law says that we can and should exclude experts if
their analysis is results driven.88 If their analysis is results driven, that’s a
credibility problem.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Right.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: But we are supposed to allow the adversarial
process during trial to deal with credibility problems, and I think that shows
that there really is a blur between credibility and reliability in most cases.
83. See generally United States v. Williams, No. 3:13-cr-00764-WHO-1, 2017 WL
3498694 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017).
84. See id. at *9.
85. See id.
86. See id. at *13.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502–03 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that “[c]oming to a firm conclusion first and then doing research to support it is the antithesis
of [the scientific] method”); Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1985)
(finding that an expert who forms their opinion prior to beginning their research “may be less
objective than he needs to be in order to produce reliable scientific results”); see also Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[I]n order to qualify as ‘scientific
knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.”).
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: To take Judge Sargus’s example, there are bad
acts that might impeach someone as a witness at trial, such as they had been
fired in disgrace or caught stealing or something. But that may not be
pertinent to whether they reliably applied a reliable methodology under
Daubert.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: Does the fact that the Daubert motion might be
case dispositive—and if there is a credibility issue in there, does that ever
cause you to do anything differently?
JUDGE SARGUS: In the case where I struck the person whose opinion
bled over into general causation, I struggled with that. It was the first of the
MDL cases we were going to try. It was clear in my mind this was not
permitted testimony on the one hand, but we teed this up over the years.
Thinking long and hard, I let the defendant’s expert witness still testify about
his disagreement with the findings of the plaintiff’s expert. So, he still was
able to come in and give lots of testimony. MDL cases are pretty hardfought, and one of the first questions the plaintiff’s expert asked of this
defendant whose causation testimony I’d stricken was, “You’ve been here
for hours and you’ve never told the jury—you haven’t offered your opinion
on specific causation.” Of course, that’s true. But it’s also true that it’s not
that he didn’t have one but that I had struck it. He did have an opinion, so to
say to him that he didn’t have an opinion—that’s not accurate.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, there are questions of expert credibility and
then there are questions about credibility experts. Where an expert is
testifying about something that could be considered an opinion about
somebody else’s truthfulness, how do you draw that line? That’s a difficult
line to draw.
JUDGE ORRICK: Just say no. [Laughter]
JUDGE SARGUS: There is a lot of case law on the topic of credibility
experts.
JUDGE VANCE: Well, for example, what is malingering? That is
something experts assess. That might be a credibility opinion, but it depends
on whether or not the expert is just saying, “Well, I’m looking at him now
and I don’t believe him” or whether someone is analyzing something in a
differential diagnosis.
JUDGE SARGUS: In a nonexpert area, the Sixth Circuit prohibits a
lawyer from asking another witness whether they think that witness is lying,
as it is essentially an opinion on someone else’s credibility.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: There could be an opinion that is less direct—for
example, an expert opinion on the unreliability of identifications. This
actually could be thought of as credibility-based testimony—that the witness
who identified the defendant is not credible.
JUDGE SARGUS: Well, if the expert testifies only about the science, that
would inform jurors about certain things that might impact credibility. It
should be allowed if the expert is staying only with the science—with all the
different factors that impair the reliability of an identification.
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: The distinction would be with general testimony
that is permissible versus specific testimony, such as “it is my expert opinion
that the witness made an inaccurate identification.”
JUDGE SARGUS: I’m sure you tell your students this in your advice you
give to them. [Laughter] So often the problem that we get into with experts
is that it’s a question too far. You don’t say in your opinion, then, “Was the
identification unreliable?” But you key it up in opening and then you
definitely bring it home in closing: “You heard what the expert said, it
matches this case to a tee. All the different factors, every one of them is
present here.” You don’t have to pull the trigger and ask the question that is
going to have an objection sustained.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: I guess it is a similar analysis about whether an
expert crosses over into legal conclusions. You can come up to the precipice
but cannot go over it.
MS. NESTER: I think some of the concern that we’ve had in prior
meetings is that a juror hears the word “expert” and then automatically makes
a credibility decision that this person—the judge has said—is an expert,
which is why it is so troubling when experts overstate, which we talked about
before. And it is interesting to me. I know a lot of judges talk to jurors after
jury trials and get their opinions and hear their feedback, and I just am curious
about your experience. Do jurors feel comfortable just completely deciding
on their own that this expert is just wholly not credible? And the question is
what role you should play. If the jurors are making that leap and if they have
been determined to be an expert, they are automatically credible. How
damaging can it be then when experts say something that is clearly wrong or
unreliable or overstating? So, I’m just curious if you have talked to jurors
after trials and if you’ve heard that they are struggling with whether they
believe an expert, or if you agree they are prone to automatically believe an
expert simply because they are an expert and the jury is not.
JUDGE SARGUS: Oh, I think they struggle. But in general there are
competing experts, so you hope that aspect of overreliance on somebody
because of a title disappears because each side has one. But occasionally,
we’ll have cases where one side has an expert—
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Particularly in criminal cases.
MS. NESTER: Exactly. That’s what I’m thinking about.
JUDGE SARGUS: If it is a civil case, you start picking up on how much
the expert is charging and hired testimony. There is a back and forth. But,
yes, I think anytime you call somebody an expert, it takes it out of the normal
credibility analysis that you otherwise give to a witness. So, that is why we
have Daubert.
JUDGE VANCE: Although we also have an instruction that we give all
the time for experts: “You assess their credibility the same way you do any
other witness.” That’s one of our standard jury instructions. Whether they
listen to that is something else. We tell them that the expert is entitled to give
an opinion, but you give it the weight you think it deserves and you should
take into account whether the expert has been paid for testifying. We have
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this long instruction on experts that doesn’t encourage them to accept at face
value what experts are.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: I think there really is a difference on this question
that you are asking between civil and the criminal cases.
JUDGE VANCE: I do, too.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: And on the civil cases, I would echo a point that
Sarah made earlier, which is that, in most civil cases the expert testimony is
not going to carry the day and it is going to depend on which expert’s
testimony meshes better with the narrative that comes out at trial. Obviously,
there are exceptions, like maybe these big medical causation questions. But
typically, I think that’s the case in a civil trial. In a criminal trial, you often
have the government bringing in an expert. The defense might not have a
counterexpert. The government might bring in a gang expert or whatever the
case may be, and I think there really is a concern in that context—when
somebody’s liberty is at stake—that too much weight will be placed on that
expert. One thing I do is that I don’t allow them to be called experts and I
don’t call them experts in the jury instructions. I say that it is opinion
testimony.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Right. Judge Richey had that rule. It is referred
to in the Committee note to the 2000 amendment to Rule 702,89 that it is a
good practice not to call the witness an expert before the jury.
JUDGE VANCE: I think it is true that in criminal cases experts have,
particularly if they are only on one side—the jury knows that they have to
find this beyond a reasonable doubt, and it could be that extra thing to hold
onto to make you think you made the right decision. If you can say, “Well,
that is what the expert said.” It might give a juror comfort to find this person
guilty because there was somebody who was qualified and supposedly doing
an objective type of analysis who validated my decision. I do think it is more
of a problem in a criminal case.
JUDGE LEE: Although in one criminal case I had—it was in the context
of cell phone data and location and the government put forth their FBI expert
on cell phone data location information. In the end, the jury acquitted, and I
went back and talked to them and they said they just didn’t believe the guy.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Did the expert overstate the accuracy of cell
phone location data?
JUDGE LEE: He overstated the accuracy and he didn’t account for the
fact that if one cell tower is busy, then you have to ping to another one. He
didn’t necessarily have a very good explanation for that and the jury just said,
“You know, we just didn’t find him credible.”
JUDGE CHHABRIA: And did those defects come out through crossexamination?

89. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
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JUDGE LEE: Yes, it came out through cross-examination. With regard
to the jury instructions, the Seventh Circuit90 has an instruction much like, I
think, the one in the Fifth Circuit,91 which says that you evaluate expert
witnesses that give opinions literally in the same manner as you would a lay
witness. I wonder whether I’m going to change that for my next trial because
it seems like, for experts, there are additional considerations that the jury
might want to take into account. But I haven’t decided yet. I’m still mulling
it over.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: You should get back to the Advisory Committee
on what you decide because that would be an interesting point for the
Committee, too.
JUDGE LEE: For experts, there surely are other things or additional things
that the jury might consider. For example, should they consider what rate of
error there is? Should they consider whether or not the methods are widely
recognized and reliable?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Maybe the jury should be instructed that you
should view expert testimony with extreme caution. [Laughter]
MS. NESTER: I vote for that.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: You could put the instructions in terms of the
Daubert factors. Has it been tested, peer-reviewed?
JUDGE LEE: I was thinking about that, but I’d have to give some more
thought about whether or not the Daubert factors really are more geared
toward judges in the gatekeeping role as opposed to experts that have already
gone through that process. Trial is not another Daubert, right? Not a second
chance at admissibility—it’s more about weighing credibility.
JUDGE MARTEN: If I could follow up on what Judge Chhabria
mentioned a few minutes ago in eliminating the term “expert.” I think that
is a terrific first step and have done that myself in the instructions, and I
advise lawyers ahead of time, “Don’t tender your witness as an expert
because I’m going to shoot you down on it and say ‘I’ll let you offer opinion
testimony with this witness.’” One other thing that is just tangential that has
come up here on criminal cases is the difference between civil and criminal.
I’m sure everybody is aware that the Defender Services Committee is really
emphasizing the need for federal defender offices and Criminal Justice Act92
lawyers to actually retain people using funds to counter what is frequently
expert testimony on the side of the prosecutions. I think that only bodes well
for the system over the long haul.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Thanks, Judge Marten. So, we have plenty more
to do with the remainder of the time we have. I would like the panel’s input
90. See COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 28 (2017), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
pattern-jury-instructions/7th_cir_civil_instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2DR-L6JQ].
91. See COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL
CASES) 33 (2016), http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/Fifth/2014civil.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WGM5-ALQL].
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2018).
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on a problem the Committee has been thinking about. There is a lot of case
law, mostly in the circuit courts, actually, that says, “if the expert has a proper
methodology, how you apply that methodology becomes a question of
weight.” And that is not accurate under Rule 702 because the questions of
sufficiency of basis and reliability of application are specifically made
questions of admissibility that the proponent must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence. I do want to turn to Judge Orrick who
discussed this issue in some detail in his opinion,93 where the government
argued, the methodology of the DNA extraction was fine and they just
messed up in terms of the application and that defect could be handled by
way of cross-examination.94
JUDGE ORRICK: So, this was another criminal case. It was a gang
case—and I described to you the first DNA opinion that I did on the
unreliability of the methodology. This same DNA was looked at six years
later because this case has been going on for a long time. I tried the first
group of five. This is the next group of four. In 2012, the methodology and
the lab determined that, for this particular area, there is a chance of four in
seven that the defendant was there.95 They’d looked at thirteen different
areas in the car.96 There was only one area where they found anything—and
four in seven.97 So, they weren’t going to use that against the guy, but times
have moved forward and so now there is probabilistic genotyping. So, they
reevaluated the DNA and determined that there was a one in 270,000 chance
that it was someone else.98
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That’s a big improvement.
JUDGE ORRICK: It was a remarkable improvement. And it would have
been quite persuasive to any juror that this guy was actually there. The issues
were that back in 2012, they determined that this DNA showed that there
were five or more contributors to this particular area, and the more
contributors you have, the less likely an extraction of one person’s DNA is
going to be reliable.99
Probabilistic genotyping has been developed to try to deal with that issue,
and this lab, when the sample was reevaluated, determined that, although
they thought there were five or more contributors in 2012, now they thought
there were only four.100 Because there were only four contributors, you could
get to the one in 270,000.101 A different person did the evaluation and
determined that this relationship was very strong. There was inconsistency
between the two experts, difficulty with the degrading of the DNA, and the
failure of the lab to—they validated 78 percent accuracy when there were
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See generally United States v. Williams, 382 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
Id. at 936–38.
Id. at 932.
See id.
See id. at 931–35.
See id. at 934.
See id. at 932.
See id. at 934.
See id.
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only four people in the mixture and they had a 100 percent failure rate for
more than four. How would they know if there were more than four in the
mixture? So, I tossed that.102
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: Did that come up with a Daubert motion?
JUDGE ORRICK: That was another Daubert, so we had a Daubert
motion in 2015 or ’16 when we did the first group.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: Did the defense have their own DNA expert?
JUDGE ORRICK: Yes. In our district, we’ve always had an expert for
the defense when the prosecution is going to be presenting something that
matters.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Was this a CJA-appointed103 expert?
JUDGE ORRICK: Yes.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And so that issue of whether the test was reliably
conducted, that’s not something the jury can figure out?
JUDGE ORRICK: There was no way that the jury could figure that out,
and it goes to a couple of the issues that we have talked about today.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Right.
JUDGE ORRICK: The certainty of the probabilistic genotyping is, I think,
a real problem for juries to be able to sort out.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Can I ask a question on your question, Dan?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Sure.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: The question of “can the jury figure out if it’s
wrong?” We sort of touched on that earlier, the question of “is this problem
so obvious the jury will pick it up?” Is that really the correct question? It
seems to me that if 702 says it’s not reliable, you don’t say, “Well, I’ll send
it to the jury because they can figure out it’s not reliable.” As the judge, you
say this doesn’t go to the jury.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That is the point I was trying to make, Judge, that
the question of application of the method is in Rule 702 for a reason because
jurors can’t figure out misapplication.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: But even if they could, it seems to me that if you
say it is misapplied, you don’t say, “Well, the jury will figure this out, so I’ll
let you give the testimony.” You don’t admit it.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Correct. “The jury can figure it out” argument
does not create an exception to the Rule 702 admissibility requirements. I
am focusing on the other side of that coin—the reliability of application
requirement is in the Rule precisely because the jury won’t be able to figure
out a problem in the application of an expert’s methodology.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: Can I just follow up on that? So, from this
morning, I thought there was some—that you could have a case in which you
make a determination of sufficient facts and data, reliable principles and
methods, and reliable application for two different experts on the opposing

102. See id. at 936–38.
103. CJA refers to the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2018).
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side on the same issue. In theory, both satisfy the gatekeeper requirements.
That might be a situation for you to think, “Well, the jury needs to be
instructed more because they have to evaluate.” They are not supposed to
make their minds up on which expert looks better, so you are evaluating the
science. That has to be part of what they are doing.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Surely Daubert does not preclude such an
instruction. I would say it actually invites that instruction.
JUDGE SARGUS: But that is pretty typical of cases where there are
medical issues. There are going to be experts giving completely opposite
opinions and the jury has to sort it out.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: One of the problems on the issue of methodology—
you asked earlier about the cases that say, “as long as the right methodology
is used, the opinion goes to the jury” and you said that is probably wrong. I
agree with that. But one of the problems with that is that often the
methodology is defined at a very high level of generality.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: So, for example, take the Bradford Hill criteria104
in the epidemiology context or the ruling-in/ruling-out methodology for
deciding what causes somebody’s disease.105 Yes, we all agree that there is
the ruling-in/ruling-out methodology and everybody is using the rulingin/ruling-out methodology, but they are applying it very differently. I think,
a lot of times, somebody is applying it so badly that it should be excluded.
But there are some cases which suggest, “No, we have this methodology and
it is an agreed-upon methodology,” and the experts come to different
conclusions and therefore it is for the jury.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Well, when you establish methodology at that
level, then you definitely need an application requirement there. Mr. Lau?
MR. LAU: I have a question for Judge Orrick and it goes to education.
So, how do you know to ask those questions about probabilistic genotyping
to firm up the evidence? Because I don’t think that would necessarily come
naturally to all judges. Where did that information come from?
JUDGE ORRICK: Well, I was very interested in the DNA issues and I
had written my first opinion on something that was important evidence in a
case. So I just kept following it and reading it. It is really to your question
earlier, Judge Schroeder. The cases where it is case dispositive or just
extremely important are the only ones that I would have live testimony at
Daubert hearings. I did on those issues and I let there be vigorous crossexamination, and I did my own research as well.
104. The “Bradford Hill criteria” include “temporal relationship, strength of association,
dose-response relationship, replication of the findings, biological plausibility, consideration
of alternative explanations, cessation of exposure, specificity of the association, and
consistency with other knowledge” to determine if there is a causal association between
variables. See In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No II) MDL 2502, 892 F.3d 624, 638 (4th Cir. 2018).
105. “[A]n expert must systematically ‘rule in’ and ‘rule out’ potential causes in arriving
at her ultimate conclusion.” See Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., 794 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir.
2015).
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VIII. TOPIC EIGHT: SUPPORT FOR JUDGES IN REVIEWING EXPERT
TESTIMONY
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, in our remaining time, I would like to discuss
possible ways to assist judges in mastering the science and other complexities
that arise when reviewing expert testimony. And so, one of the issues that
has often been discussed is whether judges could use some kind of support,
some expertise in scientific areas specifically, but in other kinds of areas as
well. Examples include a court-appointed expert witness under Rule 706,106
or a technical advisor. Any thoughts on the panel?
JUDGE SARGUS: Speaking only for myself, I’ve used it rarely.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Yes.
JUDGE SARGUS: To the competency issue in criminal cases, I’ve hired
my own expert when there are people disagreeing. But beyond that, I’ve
never used Rule 706 nor appointed a technical advisor.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Well, in DuPont, you had a science panel.
JUDGE SARGUS: But I would expect they would never do that again.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Did you order a science panel?
JUDGE SARGUS: Well, DuPont’s study cost just under thirty million
dollars, so we struggled with the cost.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Maybe you could order a cheap science panel.
[Laughter]
JUDGE SARGUS: There is a quite a bit of expense in a science panel and
an epidemiological study. It takes a large number of people, particularly if
you are talking about rare forms of cancer. In this case it was 70,000 people.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And the silicone breast implant was another case
where they had a science panel, but that cost many millions of dollars.107 It
was a pilot project.
JUDGE SARGUS: And the Rule says you can impose the cost on the
parties. I can see a unified cry from that, for that kind of money.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Right.
JUDGE VANCE: The lawyers hate it when the judge appoints an expert,
so you usually get pushback. You have to follow the Rule 706 procedure.
I’ve done it very rarely. I can’t remember more than once. It could have
been more. I’ve done competency experts that I have appointed, so it’s
probably more than once.
But you have the issue that sometimes you don’t find out that you need it
until it’s too late. You have to build in time for the expert to do the work, to
get the other experts reports, to write a report, to be deposed. So you are
building in all this time into a case and the expense and the cost. And then
there is the issue of finding somebody who is truly—I mean, nobody is a
106. FED. R. EVID. 706 (governing the appointment of court-appointed expert witnesses).
107. See generally LAURA L. HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NEUTRAL SCIENCE
PANELS: TWO EXAMPLES OF COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS IN THE BREAST IMPLANTS PRODUCT
LIABILITY LITIGATION (2001), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/NeuSciPa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W8SY-7RUK].
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tabula rasa—but somebody who is independent enough. The good thing
about a court-appointed expert is that ideally they don’t have a financial
interest in the matter so that kind of cuts off, you would hope, that linkage
between “I’m being paid to say this; a lawyer wants me to say these things;
we need to win.” A court-appointed expert would not have that incentive,
but there are real practical drawbacks, and I think that’s why judges do it
really infrequently.
JUDGE LEE: I find that, in my experience, where I would really love to
have a 706 expert is where the adversarial process doesn’t provide me with
the opposing view. And the way this often comes up is with motions of
preliminary approval of class action settlements. I just dealt with a NCAA
student concussion case, had an MDL panel, and the question was, “Is the
money that the NCAA is providing and setting aside for this fifty-year
monitoring program going to be sufficient?”108 And so, the NCAA had this
great economist from the University of Chicago and he did all this workup.
The plaintiffs, of course, said “Yes, that works.”109 But, of course, for class
action settlements, I had an independent duty to assess the adequacy of it.110
On the one hand, I thought it would be really useful to have a Rule 706 expert
on that.
On the other hand, I realized that, whatever money it would cost for the
expert, I’m taking away from the settlement, from the class. So the expert
who might improve the settlement would also harm the class members that
the settlement should actually try to benefit. In the end, I just had the experts
submit a couple other supplemental reports. I had them come in and testify,
and I asked them a bunch of questions. In the end, I decided not to retain a
706 expert because I thought I had enough information. The number for the
medical monitoring portion of the settlement was seventy million dollars. I
didn’t want to squander another two or three million just to satisfy, I guess,
my curiosity or question to the nth degree with regard to the fairness of the
settlement.
PROFESSOR CHENG: I’m hearing a lot of administrative concerns: it
costs a lot of money; where do I find the expert?; the expert needs time so
that creates delay. Do any of you have philosophical objections to the 706
court-appointed expert or the technical advisor in the sense that it makes you
too much of an active judge, it doesn’t respect the adversarial system? The
reason why I ask is, about ten years ago I did a survey of judges at a
conference—it was a mixed group of state and federal judges—and you
would be astounded at the kinds of responses I got. I got responses all over
the spectrum, from people saying, “Appointing an expert would be great and
I would use this if I could because I want to get the right result,” to people

108. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., 341 F.R.D. 580, 607 (N.D. Ill.
2016).
109. See id.
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
approve it only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate . . . .”).
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crossing out the entire survey saying, “We only call balls and strikes therefore
I am not going to get involved and call my own expert.”
JUDGE ORRICK: So, I will give you another answer to that question.
We have a lot of patent cases in our district. I don’t understand science all
that well. I really don’t understand patents. They are not written in English.
I just don’t like them. So, I’ve thought from time to time, “Wouldn’t it be
great to just hire somebody to give me the answer to a patent question?” And
what I’ve been afraid of is that I would rely completely on that person and
not do my job. I would not struggle with the issues, I would rely on
somebody who actually knows the business. Now, I think the system ought
to change so that I don’t have to do patent cases anymore. [Laughter] But
until that happens, I think I’ve got an obligation to do it and I worry about
not doing my job if I relied on a court-appointed expert.
JUDGE SARGUS: Rule 706 really goes off in two different directions.
There is the one just mentioned by Judge Orrick about educating the judges
on certain issues. You are getting into a much bigger idea when you have a
science panel. Just to be clear, I’m not going to take any side here. The
biggest issue in these mass tort cases is usually general causation. An
individual plaintiff can’t afford an epidemiological study. So, if I were a
defendant required to pay thirty million dollars for a study that implicated me
in thousands of cases, you would be going from rules and procedure into
something much more sensitive. I’m not saying I would be opposed to it,
I’m just saying that would be the outcome of this if appointing a science panel
became the norm. You would get a lot of blowback.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Chhabria?
JUDGE CHHABRIA: I was just going to answer Professor Cheng’s
question by asking a question of the judges on the panel. Raise your hand if
you have had a party’s expert come into your courtroom and testify in a way
that was not results driven. [No hands raised]
JUDGE SARGUS: They are the odd witness. I’ve had people who were
emergency room doctors, people like that, but anybody who has been
retained, they are results driven.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: So, we all agree that even though, under the law,
we are supposed to exclude an expert witness if his analysis is results driven,
we all agree that every paid expert that we’ve ever heard testimony from has
provided a results-driven analysis.
JUDGE SARGUS: They are there for a reason.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: And so, if that is true, why should we not really
want to have one of our own experts? We are talking now, by the way, about
the Daubert context, not at trial. In the Daubert context, why wouldn’t we
want to have somebody who we can ask questions of and will be confident
will give us an honest answer and doesn’t have an interest in the case?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And you could limit the role. In other words, I
don’t get from this expert the answer to the dispute, such as does X cause Y.
But I get the expert to explain what this term means, what that answer means,
et cetera. And another benefit of having a neutral expert is that her mere

2020]

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES

1259

presence might cause the opposing experts to be less outlandish in their
opinions. It’s like having an observer at an election.
JUDGE VANCE: Well, the whole gatekeeper role interposes the court
into the adversarial process anyway. If you have to do it, I don’t think that
the argument that, “Well, you are intruding on the adversarial process if you
bring in an expert to help you with Daubert issues” is dispositive.
It is anticipated that you are going to have to get involved in making this
determination, so I think getting help is not a problem as far as the adversarial
system goes—as long as the parties are able to question the expert. But on
the issue of appointing experts and when they can be helpful, in the NFL
concussion case, Judge Brody appointed a special master to do exactly what
you are talking about, Judge Lee—to evaluate that settlement and to
determine whether or not it was fair to the players.111 The master came back
and said no. She rejected the settlement and they came back and put up a lot
more money.112 And so the expert was very helpful. The plaintiffs and
defendants were all hunky-dory on the settlement and she just had misgivings
about it and was helped by having a master.
JUDGE CHHABRIA: Oh, John, I was just going to offer to you, and I
know this is a little bit off topic, but in the preliminary approval context—
the concern about taking money from the settlement fund. You could say,
“I’m denying the motion for preliminary approval because you have not
given me sufficient information to assess whether this is a fair settlement and
so you need to come back with something more.” The “something more”
might be providing the money for a court-appointed expert to allow me to
assess the fairness.
JUDGE LEE: And in my case, the “something more” was I just wanted
supplemental reports and disclosures to drill down a bit more to exactly what
the expert was saying—I grilled him for about sixty minutes about my
various concerns. But I think the concern about the adversarial process in
some respects is—I don’t think a Rule 706 expert necessarily intrudes on that
for all the reasons that Judge Vance talked about. But also I find that when I
most want one is when the adversarial process is not giving me what I need.
So, it is a failure of the adversarial process that prompts me to want a 706
expert in the first place. I feel that the parties haven’t addressed issues in a
way that will allow me to make some of these decisions.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: And then it is easier to make them pay money if
they haven’t done their job, really. Judge Campbell?
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, my question was similar to what John just
raised. This panel, in much of the discussion this morning, has been focused
on MDL cases or other large cases where we’ve generally got good lawyers,
good experts, and the issues are somewhat more sharply defined. A much
bigger problem, I find, is in cases where the lawyers don’t deal with Daubert
111. See Order Appointing Special Master, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
2:12-md-2323-AB (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2019), ECF 10739.
112. See Memorandum, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2:12-md-2323-AB
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2014), ECF 5657.
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properly, don’t present the right issues. I’m not looking for another expert,
I’m looking for another lawyer [laughter] to help present the issues clearly.
A question I have is whether there is something that can be done with the
rule that will focus, sharpen what lawyers bring to the table when they come
forward with a Daubert motion instead of what I call a cross-examination
motion, where they call it a Daubert brief but they just put in there everything
they can say that is bad about the expert and hope I do something with it. Is
there something we can do that helps focus them on 702 factors and on the
fact that the proponent must establish those factors by a preponderance of the
evidence under Rule 104(a)?113 It is rarely presented that clearly.
JUDGE SARGUS: I don’t have an answer for you. Actually, that is a
problem.
JUDGE ORRICK: You know, in our district, for preliminary approvals of
class settlements, we have a very long list of things that the lawyers have to
provide us that are well beyond the Rule and are very helpful in analyzing
whether there is a fair settlement or not.114 And I imagine that smarter people
than I could come up with a list, maybe not a generic list but a list for lawyers
by the second or third case management conference that says, “This is what
I need to know. This is what you need to present.”
PROFESSOR CAPRA: We need a best practices panel for lawyers.
JUDGE LEE: I mean, to some extent, the amendments to Rule 23115 have
tried to do that, right, on settlements. There is all this case law about what
lawyers needed to bring up or show and the amendment tried to flesh that
out. I think it has been really helpful in that context.
IX. TOPIC NINE: JUDICIAL EDUCATION EFFORTS
PROFESSOR CAPRA: So, now, to close out, I would like us to conclude
with a discussion about judicial education efforts that would assist judges in
managing and deciding Daubert issues.
The Advisory Committee is working with the FJC on developing judicial
education programs on Daubert, currently with regard to scientific evidence,
but hopefully more broadly. As judges, do you think such a program would
be useful? And if you have any suggestions, we would like to hear them.
Knowing what you know about judicial education programs, would Daubert
be a topic that judges would be interested in?
JUDGE VANCE: I think the science in the forensic area would be really
useful because that is something that a lot of us have not been indoctrinated
on, and I think that would be helpful.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Where you would take judges through the process
of some forensic process, such as ballistics, and show what the issues are?

113. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
114. Procedural Guidance for Class Action Settlements, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR N.
DISTRICT CAL. (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/procedural-guidancefor-class-action-settlements [https://perma.cc/ZVG7-6JMP].
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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JUDGE VANCE: Right. What the issues are, what the limits of the
method are.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Right. What the rate of error might be.
JUDGE VANCE: —what the rate of error might be so that they can
identify how far, how much of that testimony they can let in and where they
need to cut it off. I think that would be very helpful.
JUDGE LIVINGSTON: With this Rule, what we hear from the Federal
Judicial Center has been very helpful. But one difficulty is that you can
assemble a panel of very good experts, sort of a science panel, and that takes
time and effort. But you could assemble them and you can invite judges—
and it could be forensics or it could be epidemiology, it could be a lot of
things. You may get forty judges to sign up. But it is costly to do it over and
over again. And so, if you knew, for instance, such a panel had been
assembled, such a program had been held and that it had been videotaped, do
you think materials like that could supplement the Manual on Scientific
Evidence?
JUDGE VANCE: Oh, sure. Sure. I think that people can get online and
look at the program, especially if you have an issue coming up. I think that
it would help to have such a program available because a lot of times judges
don’t get interested in an issue until they have it before them, and then you
want it right away. If there is something online that you could access, that
would be helpful.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: Would it be helpful to have it by type of problem?
In other words, handwriting versus something else.
JUDGE VANCE: Yes. Yes.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: So that if you have a handwriting expert, you go
to that one and—
JUDGE VANCE: Yes.
JUDGE SCHROEDER: —hear the issues.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: That’s a good question.
JUDGE SARGUS: I think it is good to have specific subject, but it would
also be good to have a presentation on some general scientific principles.
Most of us don’t come from a science background and we kind of learn it
over the years, but I think you could do both the general and the specific.
JUDGE ORRICK: The FJC put on a climate science thing, which I went
to, and the purpose of it was not to debate science issues but to say, “Here is
the best evidence, these are the places that you look to determine what is true
or not.” It walked you through the scientific analysis of how you would deal
with that issue. I think it would be helpful at the FJC national conference or
something, maybe you take a couple of hours and talk about—
JUDGE VANCE: You are talking about the National Workshop?
JUDGE ORRICK: The National Workshop.
JUDGE VANCE: They do those three times, too.
JUDGE ORRICK: So, maybe do something on scientific principles and
how they would apply and—
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: And you have to do it in that kind of
nonadversarial way.
JUDGE ORRICK: —pick whatever it is.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Forensics is difficult, you know, with all the
controversy about it. But you could try and do it as down the middle as you
could.
PROFESSOR CHENG: I would encourage you to look at two things. One
is the specificity of these programs. I think, if you pick out a specific forensic
science, first of all, you get less bang for your buck than if you do something
on general forensics principles—the general problems that you might have
in forensics. Sure, you talk about handwriting as an example, but the
program should be one that is much broader. The same goes for other kinds
of science. If you are providing a statistics or epidemiology seminar, I think
that is much more useful than anything that is directed at a particular area.
The point I would make is that format matters. A lot of these conferences
are often done in conference format and then you tape the person in a room
kind of like this on a panel talking about things. It works well live, but it
doesn’t deliver the information that the judge might want in a concise way.
There is a lot more filler, or there is a lot of interaction. You almost want to
create for video purposes this kind of tutorial, so it is almost like distance
learning or something like that rather than, “Well, we want to hold a
conference with forty people and we taped it and now we put it online.” I
think you will get better return if you do it like a tutorial.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: One final thing. Judge Vance has a suggestion
for some kind of red-flag list, a little chart or something instead of a whole
full-blown treatise about any particular scientific area—such as, what red
flags to look for in testimony about specific causation or about standards and
practices or whatever the topic is.
JUDGE VANCE: Yes, that would be really helpful.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: I would echo that because we get a lot of material
across our desk on education and other things. When you get a four-inchthick FJC manual of scientific evidence, issue spotting may be the problem.
Maybe you ought to ask the question because you don’t always get objections
in criminal cases, at least in my district. I don’t get experts on the other side.
They don’t even object. Then I am looking at plain error and so I’m the one
that has to do it. So, what would be helpful for issue spotting? Is that what
you are thinking of with the red flag?
JUDGE VANCE: Exactly. What are the typical problems, shortcuts that
people use in this type of testimony, whether it is forensics or whether it is
epidemiology or engineering? If somebody is going to do it wrong, what are
they going to do and what would you look for? The same thing with
economics. I’ve asked experts, antitrust experts, on both sides, “How do I
look for the problems?” And they will tell you. They can tell you right then
and there what things people do to be result driven or to take shortcuts or to
raise problems with their methodology. So, I think it would, by area, be
helpful.
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PROFESSOR CAPRA: We would hire those Rule 706 experts that
nobody is using. [Laughter] We are coming to the close. I’m going to give
it over to Judge Campbell to close the proceedings.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, thanks. I get to do that because I chair the
Committee that reviews what the Evidence Committee does. I’ve been
sitting here through this morning thinking, “Gosh, I wish our Committee was
here to hear all of the things you’ve shared.”
702 is—well, Daubert is—a tough area. It is complicated. It varies greatly
from case to case and expert to expert and lawyer to lawyer. It is, I find, very
hard to answer the question, “How do you write a Rule that helps solve all of
these problems and elevate the level of lawyering and judging that is
needed?” That’s what the Committee has been wrestling with for a few
years, and, to me, the best thing we can do in trying to find that answer is
listen to you experts and what is happening in your courts. So, I think it has
been a valuable morning, and I’m going to recommend to the folks on my
Committee that they read the transcript of what has been said here. I’m not
sure what the answers are, but we have sure gained a lot of helpful
information. The best part, from a selfish point of view, is I go back a better
judge having listened to what you all have shared, so thank you very much
for the time.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Thanks to the panel so much. I’m so grateful. It
couldn’t have gone better in my view. And that is on the record. [Laughter]

